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Preface
This monograph resulted from research and discussions conducted by the RTI 
International Energy Grand Challenge Working Group, which formed in 2009 within 
the framework of the RTI Fellows Program’s Grand Challenge Initiatives. These 
initiatives confront major, urgent challenges facing the United States (and, indeed, 
humanity) that can benefit from the kind of integrated, multidisciplinary analysis that 
a diverse, independent research institute like RTI can provide.
The Energy Grand Challenge Working Group consisted of representatives of RTI’s 
technology, economics, and social science research functions who set out to explore 
the energy challenge as an intersection of three domains: technology, economics, and 
societal factors. Although, from the beginning, ours was an integrative approach, we 
have relied on the expertise of group members in their respective disciplines. In the 
energy technology domain, the group and the writing were led by L. Louis Hegedus; 
in the economics domain, by Robert H. Beach; and in the societal factors domain, by 
Toby H. Moore.
The objective of this work was to help frame the ongoing discussion of America’s 
energy future in the context of all three dimensions—technology, economics, and social 
sciences—and to draw attention to research needs pertaining to the intersection of the 
societal factors domain with technology and economics. We hope that the proposed 
research will identify tools and techniques for not merely overcoming, but in fact 
harnessing, societal forces for the creation of a better energy future for our nation.
L. Louis Hegedus and Dorota S. Temple, Editors
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, USA  
June 2011
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Introduction
Chapter 1
The late Richard Smalley, Nobel Prize–winning chemist and codiscoverer of a new 
allotropic form of the element carbon (buckminsterfullerene, C60), which prompted the 
onset of the nanotechnology wave, delivered a much-quoted presentation in 2003 on 
humanity’s top ten problems for the next 50 years.1 He concluded that the most important 
issue and, therefore, the greatest challenge facing humanity is energy. In order of declining 
significance, the other problems were water, food, the environment, poverty, terrorism and 
war, disease, education, democracy, and population. All the challenges that follow energy 
are influenced and often dominated by energy; conversely, many of these other challenges 
have important implications for how the energy challenge may best be addressed.
At least three major viewpoints define how the US energy challenge is considered. 
Some view it primarily through climate-change considerations, related to carbon dioxide 
(CO2) accumulation in the atmosphere and its actual or anticipated consequences. Others 
view it through the issues of energy security, pertaining to imported oil and related 
security and defense challenges, while yet others view the energy challenge primarily 
through its economic contexts, such as oil prices and price instabilities, impact on the US 
economy, trade balance, and impact on US currency.
Associated with these viewpoints are many additional concerns, including 
sustainability (how long the world’s oil, natural gas, uranium, and coal supplies will last); 
globalization (the impact of rapidly growing energy demand in developing countries and 
the related economic, political, and environmental issues); regulation and taxation (how 
the government should respond to the energy challenge); politics (local and national 
constituencies, party ideologies); public preferences (impact of energy considerations on 
the quality of life and standard of living, or perceived balance between convenience and 
environmental responsibility); and the status and potential of technological developments 
(the balance between technologies that are available now, those that will be available in the 
near future, and those that may become longer-term “game changers”).
The US National Academies Committee on America’s Energy Future set out to study 
the title subject upon its formation in 2007. Its objective is to “inform policy makers about 
technology options for transforming energy production, distribution, and use to increase 
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sustainability, support long-term economic prosperity, promote energy security, and 
reduce environmental impacts.”2(p1) A series of reports resulted from the work, including 
America’s Energy Future: Summary of a Meeting;3 America’s Energy Future: Technology 
and Transformation;2 and Real Prospects for Energy Efficiency in the United States.4 Also of 
significance to our analysis is a recent National Research Council report, Hidden Costs of 
Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use.5
We can group the issues considered in these reports into three main categories: 
technological, economic, and societal considerations. America’s Energy Future: Technology 
and Transformation2 concludes that of these three, the “weakest link” is an insufficient 
understanding of the societal dimension. Accordingly, the report makes extensive calls 
for more data, analysis, and recommendations from the societal research disciplines. It 
concludes that “mobilization of the public and private sectors, supported by sustained 
long-term policies and investments, will be required for the decades-long effort to 
develop, demonstrate, and deploy these technologies.”2(p1)
The report emphasizes the need to consider “policy and societal factors that would 
enhance or impede technology development and deployment”2 (p10) and observes that a 
“study on energy conservation would require, for example, an in-depth understanding of 
how societal, economic, and policy factors affect energy consumption.”2(p33) It refers to a 
“behavioral gap” that hinders the introduction of energy-efficient technologies, despite 
their economic advantages, and calls for continuing research to understand this gap more 
fully so that strategies can be devised for closing it.2(p50) Other societal research needs 
listed in the report include land use considerations in siting renewable technologies, 
opportunities for incentivizing businesses and the public, and opportunities for energy 
education. (For a collection of report excerpts pertaining to the societal dimension, see 
the appendix.)
The committee’s call for the societal analysis of the US energy equation has motivated 
us to address this important topic and thereby provide a societal research–focused 
complement to the National Academies’ technology-focused effort. Our approach 
recognizes the complexity of the problem, manifest in the intricate interactions among the 
technological, economic, and societal dimensions of the energy challenge. Consequently, 
we realize that the societal dimension should be discussed not in isolation but in its 
integrated, holistic context, at its intersection with technology and economics. For this 
purpose, we formed an interdisciplinary team of investigators at RTI International, an 
independent research organization with expertise in all three key dimensions of the 
energy problem.
 Introduction 3
Energy technology and energy economics are necessary, although not sufficient, 
conditions for solving the energy conundrum; the sufficient condition derives from the 
societal dimension. Before developing the arguments grounded in the societal dimension, 
we provide, in Chapters 2 and 3, an overview of energy technologies and energy 
economics, respectively.
We discuss energy technologies in terms of their infrastructure, as the National 
Academies’ report did. In our description of energy infrastructure, we point to those 
aspects that couple strongly with economics and social science knowledge gaps that need 
to be filled by new research. Similarly, we discuss energy economics in its technological 
and social context, establishing the basis for next discussing the societal dimension.
After we examine energy technologies and energy economics, in Chapter 4 we identify 
and describe our current understanding of the societal issues associated with the US 
energy challenge. We highlight the technological-economic-societal intersection and 
identify new social research needs in Chapter 5. These research opportunities are expected 
to drive progress at two levels: first, they may stimulate the development of improved or 
new tools, techniques, and recommendations to overcome the societal barriers identified 
in the Academies’ report; second, and perhaps even more important, they may help 
identify additional opportunities for harnessing social forces to accelerate progress toward 
a rational energy future.

Energy Technologies
Chapter 2
Technology is based on the application of the laws of nature, which are immutable. 
Superimposed on technology are the conditions of economics (nothing can be 
implemented that cannot be funded) and societal driving forces and constraints. In the 
discussion of energy technologies, we highlight societal concerns as appropriate. 
Energy Infrastructure
We discuss energy technologies according to the energy infrastructure they serve. A 
nation’s energy infrastructure is its collection of resources, facilities, equipment, and 
systems for the exploration, extraction, conversion, storage, distribution, and use of 
primary and secondary energy sources. 
Energy technologies can be defined as the intellectual property (patents and know-how) 
that are required to operate the energy infrastructure. All energy technologies have some 
common characteristics; these have to be considered when comparing the technologies 
or when technology preferences and technology portfolios are discussed. These common 
characteristics include their thermodynamic, operating, and material efficiencies; capital 
and operating costs; scale and scalability (modularity); environmental, health, climate, 
political, security, defense, and market risks and impacts; technological and market 
maturity; economic, resource, and environmental sustainability; and the trajectory and 
slope of their evolution, including their potential for breakthrough developments.
The US energy infrastructure is famously depicted in energy flow charts published 
yearly by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory of the US Department of Energy.6 
Figure 2.1 is the 2008 US energy flow chart on which our discussion throughout this 
chapter is based.
In 2008, the United States used 99.2 quads of energy from the primary energy sources 
shown in Figure 2.1. (One quad equals 1015 British thermal units, or BTUs). Of the 
99.2 quads of energy, 7.28 (7.3 percent) came from renewable sources—solar, wind, 
hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass; 83.39 (84.1 percent) came from fossil fuels—
natural gas, coal, and petroleum (crude oil); and 8.45 (8.5 percent) came from nuclear 
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Figure 2.1. US energy use in quads, 2008
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 Energy Technologies 7
energy. Biomass, counted as a renewable source, contributed 3.88 quads (3.9 percent), 
21 percent of which went for transportation. Approximately one-third of the total US 
energy consumption came from imported sources.
Some notable facts about the primary US energy sources:
•	 Despite	all	efforts	to	expand	the	use	of	renewable	sources	(solar,	hydroelectric,	wind,	
geothermal, and biomass in Figure 2.1), they remain a small proportion of sources 
overall (7.3 percent).
•	 All	of	nuclear	power	and	91.6	percent	of	coal	are	used	to	generate	electricity.
•	 Transportation	consumes	70.9	percent	of	the	petroleum	used	in	the	United	States.
•	 Almost	all	energy	imports	are	petroleum;	in	2009	about	62	percent	of	petroleum	and	
petroleum products consumed in the US came from imports.  
•	 Only	2.8	percent	of	natural	gas	is	used	for	transportation.
Energy Sources
In this section we discuss the key US energy source technologies. They each have a large 
literature that is extensively cited in the National Academies reports.2-5 Unless stated 
otherwise, the numerical data quoted in this chapter are from the US Department of 
Energy’s Energy Information Administration database.9 
Sustainable energy Sources
A number of primary energy sources are sustainable (i.e., considered inexhaustible or 
renewable). Among these sustainables are hydroelectric, geothermal, solar-thermal, solar-
electric, wind-electric, wave-electric, and biomass energy sources.
Hydroelectric
Hydroelectric energy generation (2.45 quads in 2008, 2.4 percent of the total) depends on 
suitable geography; it is perceived to be almost fully developed in the United States.
Geothermal
Geothermal energy is feasible at volcanic locations, such as the edges of tectonic plates in 
California and Iceland. It can generate electricity by means of steam turbines or provide 
heating. About 0.3 percent of the world’s electrical generating capacity comes from 
geothermal plants, with a global generating capacity of more than 10 gigawatts (GW). 
The largest geothermal generating site in the world is the Geysers, north of San Francisco, 
where 22 plants have a combined capacity of 1,517 megawatts (MW). Proposed novel 
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geothermal technologies include hot (steam) wells drilled to a depth of up to 10 kilometers; 
this technology, if realized, would mitigate the current geographic limitations.
Solar
Solar energy (0.09 quads in 2008, 0.09 percent of the total) has a high but declining 
levelized cost (combination of capital and operating expenses, expressed as the cost of a 
unit quantity of energy) due to high capital expenses; therefore, to be competitive today, it 
requires government subsidy or needs to find niche, less cost-sensitive applications.
Solar technologies are either solar-electric or solar-thermal; solar-electric technologies 
involve crystalline silicon (efficient but expensive), thin film (less efficient but also less 
expensive), and amorphous silicon (cheapest but inefficient). Solar-thermal technologies 
involve nonfocused sunlight for heating water or focused sunlight to generate high 
temperatures that can be used directly (steam turbines) or indirectly (via pyrolysis of 
agricultural waste into syngas, a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide, followed by 
catalytic processing into solar biofuels).
Challenges of solar energy include intermittent operation (requiring energy storage) and 
the need to operate at sunny, often remote locations (requiring a “smart grid” that would 
compensate for the uneven spatial and temporal distribution of this form of electricity). 
The solar plant’s footprint is a function of solar irradiation intensity and of the areal 
efficiency of the solar cells or solar collectors.
Wind
Some of the challenges of wind energy (0.52 quads used in 2008, 0.5 percent of the total) 
are similar to those of solar energy. Both are capital intensive, intermittent, and often 
remote, and at present both require subsidies, energy storage, and a smart electric grid. 
Some issues with wind energy are associated with changing the landscape, as wind turbines 
tend to be huge installations, or that they interfere with birds and other wildlife, such as 
bats. Additional challenges include the need for addressing reliability and maintenance 
requirements, such as periodic cleaning to remove debris, life expectancy, and recyclability 
of the structures and components.
The suitability of locations for developing wind energy varies significantly across the 
earth’s surface. Like solar, wind energy is intermittent; most of the power is derived during 
relatively brief periods of high winds. Wind speeds change with the seasons and may or 
may not correspond to peak electricity demands, e.g., in the southwest United States, 
wind speeds tend to be low during the hot summer months, when air conditioning drives 
the demand for electricity. Conversely, in the United Kingdom the demand for power 
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is highest in the winter, when wind speeds there are also at their peak. Because of this 
temporal and geographic variability, wind power is a complementary energy source to 
traditional sources and needs to be integrated into the power grid in coordination with 
other forms of electrical generation.
Tidal and Wave
In theory, tidal and wave energy offers an inexhaustible source of mechanical energy that 
can be converted into electricity by means of electric generators. The first tidal power 
plant was built in France in the early 1960s (La Rance, 240 MW). High capital costs and 
geographic site limitations constrain the development of this primary source of electric 
energy.
Biomass
Biomass (3.88 quads in 2008, 3.9 percent of the total) represents a significant but complex 
and, by its nature, somewhat limited opportunity to contribute to the US energy balance 
equation. Involved are biomass-based fuels and gasoline admixtures (ethanol), and 
biodiesels based on chemically processed vegetable oils. Some of the complexity comes 
from the present-day primary source of bioethanol (subsidized corn), which can compete 
with food needs, or from complex performance issues (e.g., biodiesels and vegetable 
oil–based aviation fuels have to conform to complex chemical, shelf-life, and physical 
property standards previously established for petroleum-based fuels). Biomass-based 
fuels are categorized as renewables in that they involve a short-term carbon cycle: plants 
incorporate CO2 taken from the atmosphere (with sunlight as the energy source) to form 
plant material such as sugars and cellulose, which can serve as feedstocks for liquid fuels. 
Although biomass is renewable, the actual renewal of biomass-based primary energy 
sources is predicated upon human involvement to renew them via agricultural activities.
Intense research is underway to use agricultural waste for producing fuels. Agricultural 
wastes are mostly cellulosic and require complex (thermochemical, catalytic, enzymatic, 
or pyrolitic) processes to convert them into intermediates that can be processed into 
fuels. Some plans call for harnessing the sun’s focused thermal energy to provide the 
gasification temperatures. All plant-based processes are limited by land availability and by 
the economic collection radii (currently perceived to be about 40 miles around the fuel 
plant, depending on the particulars of fuel source, conversion process, and the resulting 
energy carrier). Some biomass-based energy conversion processes are viewed as being 
net energy producing (despite the needs of plowing, seeding, fertilizing, harvesting, and 
collecting), and they are also viewed as CO2-neutral in that they tend to recycle CO2 from 
the atmosphere via photosynthesis.
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Depletable energy Sources
Most of the United States’ conventional energy sources are depletable; they include the 
fossil fuels coal, oil, and natural gas, as well as nuclear energy.
Coal
The United States has hundreds of years’ worth of coal (22.42 quads in 2008, 22.6 percent 
of the total) at current rates of consumption. Coal is the most important commodity 
carried by rail, at about 44 percent of Class I rail tonnage; about two-thirds of US coal 
shipments are by rail. Ninety-two percent of coal is used for electricity generation; 51 
percent of US electricity is generated by burning coal.
Coal is central to the current energy debate. The nation’s ability to address this primary 
energy source intelligently will significantly affect the US energy future. Although coal is 
abundant, cheap, and domestic, it is beset with some major externalities (we discuss these 
unaccounted-for costs further in Chapter 3). These externalities include pollution in the 
form of sulfur and nitrogen oxides, mercury emissions, and about 300,000 tons of ash per 
GW-sized power plant per year, assuming 10 percent ash content of the coal.10 In addition, 
coal-fired power plants are the most prolific sources of CO2 emissions, both in absolute 
terms and on the basis of tons per kilowatt-hour (kWh); therefore, these plants are 
implicated in the atmospheric accumulation of this greenhouse gas. Furthermore, open-
face coal mining, a method widely employed in the United States today, has a significant 
environmental and ecological impact.
Given coal’s importance, it is no wonder that major efforts are underway (political, 
economic, scientific, engineering) to deal with its challenges. Among these efforts 
are increasingly complex and expensive methods to control flue gas emissions, 
thermodynamically more efficient boiler and generator technologies (including so-called 
combined cycles with higher overall thermodynamic efficiency), and projects aimed at 
concentrating and storing (“sequestering”) CO2 emissions. Sequestering CO2 is associated 
with increased capital and operating costs of electricity, a significantly derated power plant 
capacity, and as of yet unresolved storage technologies and storage site liabilities, so its 
viability has not yet been established.
Further complicating coal’s role is the fact that the two largest developing economies, 
China and India, are also heavily coal fueled. This fact poses unresolved political issues 
regarding the contribution of these countries to potential global CO2-reduction programs, 
not to mention the clouds of pollution (e.g., sulfur oxides, mercury) that were detected 
traveling across continental boundaries (e.g., from China to California).
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So far it has been economical to control pollutants (mostly sulfur and nitrogen oxides) 
in the flue gases of coal-fired power plants. However, the economics of CO2 sequestration 
(separation, concentration, storage) will have to be compared with the economics of 
alternative ways of reducing CO2 emissions, such as increased reliance on other primary 
energy sources (more nuclear, more natural gas, more solar, more wind) or energy-
saving technologies in the energy-consuming sectors such as industrial, construction, 
and transportation. Given the recently discovered large potential US natural gas reserves 
(shale gas),11 it is likely that many of the newly constructed power plants will be fueled by 
natural gas, followed in time by a mix of natural gas and nuclear.
Oil
In 2009 the United States used about 22 percent of the world’s oil output: of this, 
72 percent of US oil consumption was for transportation and about 22 percent for 
industrial purposes, including the manufacture of chemicals. Only 1 percent was used 
in electricity generation. US domestic oil production peaked in 1970 (at 9.6 million 
barrels per day) and is now in decline. Oil imports grew to exceed domestic production 
beginning in 1993. In 2009 about 61 percent of US oil consumption was from imports, 
and a significant, although not dominant, portion of the imports came from countries 
with challenging economic, political, national security, or military issues (Middle East, 
Africa, South America). As of this writing, we are witnessing political upheavals in the 
Middle East, some in the major oil-producing countries. These events will surely impact 
oil supply security and oil prices and price stability, as well as the fate of alternative energy 
technologies.
Foreign oil reserves are increasingly owned by national corporations that are controlled 
by governments. Some of the main oil transportation routes from the Middle East (35 
percent of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and 34 percent passes 
through the Strait of Malacca) require military protection, a heavy cost burden to the 
US taxpayer. 
Twelve percent of the known domestic US oil reserves exist under lands protected by 
environmental laws and, therefore, are not currently accessible for production.
Oil is a commodity, traded on major commodity markets, and its price has been 
fluctuating wildly. Oil prices, in general, are far above typical exploration, extraction, 
and transportation costs, reflecting in part the combination of risks involved. Oil quality 
and ease of extraction have been gradually declining, necessitating an increasing degree 
of “secondary recovery,” which involves various chemical, thermal, or physical ways of 
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stimulating the reservoirs, or advanced drilling techniques such as deep-water offshore 
drilling and horizontal drilling. Finally, very large oil reserves are available from oil 
shale, but it is expensive to process with the use of conventional technologies and is beset 
with potential environmental liabilities. It is unlikely that all oil resources will be fully 
exhausted before more of our transportation infrastructure switches to other energy 
sources for propulsion.
Oil-fueled transportation has depended on the internal combustion engine, a device 
that is substantially limited by the inefficiency of the Carnot thermodynamic cycle 
(interestingly, the Carnot cycle would be quite efficient if internal combustion engines 
could operate at much higher temperatures, but such internal combustion engines are 
currently perceived to be beyond practicality). The ongoing large effort to replace the 
Carnot cycle with electric propulsion is aimed at mitigating our dependence on oil, 
freeing the use of more of that substance for alternative, more efficient, and higher-valued 
uses, such as the manufacture of chemicals, plastics, and pharmaceuticals.
Natural Gas
In contrast to oil, natural gas is not easily portable across oceans. Its cryogenic storage 
and transportation are commercially viable but expensive and therefore limited. However, 
natural gas can be safely and economically transported and distributed by continental 
pipelines. Relatively speaking, it is a cleaner source of thermal energy. For the same 
amount of electricity produced, a natural gas–fired power plant emits about half of the 
CO2 emissions that a coal-fired power plant emits, with no ash content, no mercury 
emissions, and much lower emissions of sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides. Natural gas 
is also an important raw material for the chemical industry. Although natural gas is a 
primary energy source, it is also suitable for conversion into secondary energy sources or 
energy carriers, such as hydrogen, methanol, gasoline, or dimethyl ether (proposed as a 
diesel fuel).
In a mid-2009 assessment,12 the Potential Gas Committee upgraded the 2008 potential 
US natural gas resources from the 2006 levels by about 39 percent. This upgrade resulted, 
in part, from the development and demonstration of technologies that can economically 
recover natural gas from abundant shale gas deposits. The recently developed shale 
gas technology involves horizontal drilling into the shale and the multistage hydraulic 
fracturing of the shale to release the natural gas.
The US Department of Energy published a review of recent US shale gas 
developments.11 Two of the largest shale gas fields are the Marcellus Shale, spreading over 
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the states of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, and the Barnett Shale in Texas. 
With the revised US reserves, at current consumption rates the United States has about 
100 years’ worth of natural gas left. This development is new and has not yet been fully 
analyzed by the energy planning community. Nevertheless, most recently constructed 
or currently planned new fossil-fueled power plants in the United States already rely on 
natural gas rather than coal. Some of the societal concerns surrounding shale gas involve 
groundwater pollution.
Nuclear
Nuclear energy (8.45 quads in 2008, 8.5 percent of the total) is carbon free and 
nonpolluting if properly managed. Current nuclear power plants employ uranium 
235–fueled fission piles. The U-235 isotope makes up about 3 percent by weight of 
the uranium reserves, and the rest is the isotope U-238. As of early 2010, the United 
States had 104 operating nuclear reactors, with 1 under construction and 9 planned; 
in comparison, the worldwide figures, including the United States, are 438 operating, 
54 under construction, and 148 planned.13 The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor 
crisis will undoubtedly affect reactor safety designs and operating practices, new reactor 
construction costs, and public attitudes about nuclear energy.
The United States uses the open fuel cycle: after about 4 percent of the energy content 
of the fuel rods is exhausted, neutron absorbers are formed that require the removal 
and replacement of the spent fuel. In the open fuel cycle mode, the spent fuel is then 
stored indefinitely, leaving about 23 tons of waste per GW-sized power plant per year, as 
compared with the 300,000 tons of ash from coal combustion as mentioned earlier. 
Several countries employ a closed fuel cycle, which involves the reprocessing of the 
spent fuel (extracting and reusing the unspent U-235 and the fission product plutonium). 
This technology improves U-235 utilization by up to about 30 percent and leaves behind 
significantly less, although more radioactive, nuclear waste (about 3 tons per GW per 
year) than the open fuel cycle, but at current uranium prices, it is uneconomical.
Reprocessing is currently discouraged by the United States, primarily because of 
the fear of proliferation: it leaves open the opportunity to isolate the fission product 
plutonium, which is susceptible to abuse. A number of countries, such as Canada, 
Sweden, Finland, Spain, and South Africa, share the United States’ position. Nuclear fuel 
reprocessing is allowed or practiced in several countries, including France, the United 
Kingdom, India, Japan, and Russia. In 2006 the United States proposed a Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP) of 25 countries to develop and deploy advanced fuel-cycle 
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technologies to improve nuclear fuel utilization and to reduce nuclear waste, without 
the risk of nuclear proliferation. A National Academy of Sciences report reviewed the 
international options for addressing issues related to reprocessing.14 The report advised 
against reprocessing, and the United States has subsequently canceled the GNEP’s 
domestic component.
From the beginnings of nuclear power to 2010, approximately one-third of the world’s 
spent light-water reactor fuel has been reprocessed commercially; the remaining spent 
fuel is stored on reactor sites, including onsite at US nuclear power plants.15 At current 
rates of consumption and at current uranium prices, reserves have been estimated to last 
for about another 50 years.16
Breeder reactors use both U-235 and U-238 in their fission fuel cycle. They could 
extend uranium supplies by a factor of about 50, perhaps into the next millennium. 
Developmental issues surrounding the breeder reactor option include safety (require the 
development of materials that can reliably resist radiation damage) and cost.
As nuclear power generation became established after the 1950s, the size of reactor 
units grew from 60 MW to more than 1,600 MW. The high capital cost of large nuclear 
reactors is driving some interest in developing smaller units. (The International Atomic 
Energy Agency defines “small” as less than 300 MW of electric power, but in general, 
today 500 MW may be considered an upper limit for “small”.) These smaller reactors 
may be built independently or as modules in a larger complex, with capacity added 
incrementally as required. Many smaller nuclear reactors have been built for naval use; 
this engineering expertise may be applicable to commercial development.17,18 A 2009 
assessment by the World Nuclear Association concluded that 43 to 96 small modular 
reactors may be operating by 2030, but none in the United States.19
Two major longer-term efforts are underway to use nuclear fusion, instead of fission, 
for energy generation; the fuel is a mixture of the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and 
tritium, which, as parts of water occurring in nature, promise an essentially inexhaustible 
supply. Because no structural material can survive the reaction temperatures, the practical 
implementation of nuclear fusion requires confining the reaction volume to isolate it from 
the reactor’s walls.
In France, an international, large-scale demonstration project aims to show 
the possibility of using fusion to produce commercial energy. The International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, ITER, project will employ a reactor called Tokamak 
(after a Russian phrase meaning “a toroidal chamber with magnetic coils”). Tokamak is 
based on the magnetic confinement of the reaction volume.
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A fusion project is also underway at the US Department of Energy’s Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory. This project employs laser-ignited inertial confinement of the 
reaction volume.
These efforts, although critical for humanity’s longer-term energy future, will likely take 
several decades to achieve commercial utility.
The social issues associated with nuclear energy include safety and security 
considerations (fuels processing or reprocessing, reactor operation, and spent-fuel 
transport and storage). These social concerns have abated somewhat in recent years given 
the increasing problems with coal (ecology, environment, and climate) and oil (supply 
security and sustainability, national security, trade balance, price instability, and more 
recently, environment and ecology). The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor crisis is 
likely, however, to affect public attitudes regarding nuclear energy and increase the social 
concerns pertaining to reactor safety.
Carbon Dioxide Generation
A significant component of energy-related issues and decision-making processes is 
represented by concerns about the potential impact of CO2 emissions on the climate.
Based mainly on US government and National Academies sources, the following 
discussion below briefly examines the Earth’s carbon balance, followed by the related 
climate considerations.
The atmosphere contains about 750 gigatons (GT, billions of metric tons) of carbon, 
according to the diagram of the carbon cycle published on NASA’s Earth Observatory web 
page.20 We can translate this number into 2,750 GT of CO2 by multiplying 750 GT by the 
CO2/C molecular weight ratio of 44/12. This 2,750 GT of CO2 in the atmosphere increases 
each year by about 12.1 GT (0.4 percent). This increase arises from the difference between 
796.0 GT CO2 emissions—26.1 GT, or 3.3 percent, of which are attributed to human 
activities—and the 783.9 GT that are reabsorbed or consumed.20
The principal global anthropogenic CO2 contributors are fossil fuel combustion and 
cement production (20.2 GT) and deforestation (5.9 GT).20 Their sum (26.1 GT) exceeds 
the net CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere (12.1 GT), implicating human activity as a 
primary causal factor of the CO2 accumulation. The various primary energy sources affect 
CO2 generation from human activity in various degrees. The 2008 US CO2 flow chart is 
shown in Figure 2.2.
The major source of anthropogenic CO2 is coal used to generate electricity (33 percent), 
followed by oil-fueled transportation (32 percent). Other anthropogenic components, not 
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Figure 2.2. US carbon dioxide emissions in million metric tons, 2008
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directly related to energy, are increased agricultural activity and deforestation. Renewable 
primary energy sources and nuclear energy are CO2-free, and biofuels are perceived to be 
CO2-neutral because they use solar energy to incorporate some of the CO2 content of the 
atmosphere into plant material (e.g., cellulose, lignin, and sugars). As mentioned before, 
natural gas, on a unit electrical energy basis, has about half of coal’s CO2 burden.
The future of the US energy infrastructure may be closely tied to the outcome of a 
cluster of CO2-related climate change issues. (A concise summary of these, with key 
data, explanations, and a list of reference reports, is available from the US National 
Academies.22) Considerations include the amount and rate of CO2 accumulation in the 
atmosphere; its causes; its past, present, and anticipated future effects on climate; the 
evolution of climate itself; projected future climate change scenarios; the effects (positive 
and negative) of climate changes on humans and on nature; and human interventions to 
suppress adverse climate change effects, with their prospects, costs, and consequences.
The science of climate change is complex. Its predictive ability relies to a significant 
extent on a feedback mechanism and on scenario modeling.23 Although the model 
predictions have been accepted by the majority of scientists and by the national academies 
of seven large industrial nations, such models carry uncertainties about the nature, size, 
and time scale of the effects predicted.24 They also carry uncertainties about the nature, 
intensity, costs, and feasibility of proposed national and global efforts to mitigate these 
predicted effects.
Notwithstanding any uncertainties in the time scale and impact of CO2 accumulation 
on climate, and the projected effects of those changes on humans and the rest of nature, 
there are strong reasons for reducing CO2 emissions in the short-term, supporting timely 
and decisive action. Beyond producing CO2, using coal and imported oil is associated 
with additional important and urgent concerns. These concerns include technological 
challenges (e.g., clean coal, safe deep-water drilling), economic challenges (e.g., supply, 
access, reserves, price, price stability, globalization, trade balance, cost and availability of 
capital, risk of capital), and social challenges (e.g., defense, security, environment, ecology, 
sustainability, globalization, foreign policy). These challenges are sufficiently significant 
and urgent to require timely action regardless of the time scale and outcomes of climate 
change considerations. Reducing the use of coal and imported oil is, of course, consistent 
with the climate change-based call for reducing CO2 emissions as well.
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Energy Generation, Distribution, and Storage
Energy carriers are secondary energy sources, converted from the primary energy sources. 
They include electricity and petroleum- and natural gas-based fuels, which are discussed 
below, as well as biofuels, hydrogen, methanol, and dimethyl ether.
electricity
The technologies for mainstream electricity generation are mostly well established and 
are based on rotating generators driven by turbines (coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydro, 
tidal, geothermal, or wind). Photovoltaic electricity requires extensive conditioning if it 
is to be coupled with the electric grid. Both solar- and wind-based electricity generation 
depend on the development of smart electric grids, which would compensate for the 
uneven spatial and temporal distribution of these forms of electricity: plants may not be 
located close to the users of the electricity, and wind and sunshine are not continuous. 
The simultaneous deployment of wind and solar energy may provide symbiotic benefits 
at some locations with sustained nighttime winds. Besides requiring a smart electric grid, 
new wind and solar electricity may also challenge the capacity of existing electric grids. 
In the absence of the smart grid, or in complement to it, various storage technologies are 
being developed for solar and wind electricity. Beyond large conventional batteries, these 
include water reservoirs, pressurized air tanks, and chemically reacting energy storage 
systems (“flow batteries”).
Much discussion surrounds the US electric grid’s ability to absorb perturbations due 
to increasing demand, the grid’s failures and failure propagation, and the addition of 
smart grids or smart-grid components to accommodate solar and wind electricity. The US 
Department of Energy has published a helpful smart-grid primer.25
Although electricity can be readily efficiently distributed with good efficiency in high-
voltage grids, efficient electricity storage represents a continuing challenge. Electricity 
usage is highly uneven in time and space, and power plants were designed to meet peak 
usage periods. Plug-in hybrid and all-electric vehicles, charged overnight, are expected to 
eventually act as effective “peak shavers.” They depend on the development of low-cost, 
high-energy-density, high-power-density, safe, and sustainable rechargeable batteries. 
Of those, rechargeable lithium batteries appear to have the technological lead and will 
probably replace the nickel-hydrogen batteries currently used in gasoline-electric hybrids.
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Fuels Based on petroleum and Natural Gas
As with generating electricity, refining petroleum to liquid fuels such as gasoline, diesel 
fuel, and aviation fuels is well established. These operations are running very close to their 
thermodynamic limits.
Natural gas can be chemically converted into liquid fuels by means of partial oxidation 
to syngas. The syngas can then be reacted by means of catalytic Fischer-Tropsch chemistry 
to form diesel fuel or gasoline via the methanol route. Because of the newly discovered 
US natural gas reserves and the resulting potential for low natural gas prices, the catalytic 
methanol-to-gasoline (MTG) technology, so far employed only in niche markets, may see 
a renaissance.
Natural gas can also be converted chemically to hydrogen, with CO2 as a by-product. 
This conversion would be the basis of the first phase of the hydrogen economy, followed 
eventually by water electrolysis via nuclear or solar electricity. Hydrogen could then 
be used to power fuel-cell vehicles; currently, several hundred fuel-cell-driven vehicles 
are operating in California (General Motors, Honda), Europe, and Japan. Perceived 
problems with hydrogen as an energy carrier include distribution, storage, and safety. 
All three problems have been addressed. Hydrogen can be distributed using a natural 
gas distribution network with locally generated hydrogen; the US Department of 
Transportation has approved hydrogen tanks that can hold 10,000 pounds per square 
inch and carry enough fuel for about 300 miles in a typical vehicle. Hydrogen fueling 
and hydrogen-fueled automobile traffic safety have been deemed to meet commercial 
requirements.
Energy Utilization
Energy utilization can be divided into residential, commercial, industrial, and 
transportation categories.
residential
Residential use is primarily for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), 
lighting, and refrigeration. It is based mainly on natural gas and electricity, with about 
10 percent coming from heating oil. The efficiency of residential energy uses has been the 
subject of many technology developments, regulatory activities, and some social research. 
Issues include the up-front cost of improvements or new construction and equipment 
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technologies as compared with the resulting reductions in operating costs. The National 
Academies’ energy-efficiency report4 highlighted some important points that require 
more societal research.
A number of significant energy-efficient residential construction and construction 
materials technologies have evolved in countries with historically high energy prices—
typically in Europe and in Japan. Adaptation of these technologies involves many 
dimensions beyond technology and economics and includes esthetic, cultural, and 
habitual factors, requiring a better understanding of these factors. One significant energy-
saving opportunity will come from the phase-out of incandescent lighting, to be replaced 
at first by fluorescent light bulbs and thereafter with solid-state light bulbs based on 
light-emitting diode (LED) technology. All will come with appropriate spectral colors for 
residential, industrial, or commercial use.
Commercial
The commercial use of energy is similar to residential uses (HVAC and lighting), but 
with more use for refrigeration. The energy efficiency of commercial buildings has greatly 
benefited from sophisticated window glass-coating technologies that filter and selectively 
control the transmittance of visible, infrared, and ultraviolet light. Commercial lighting 
has pioneered the use of low-energy light sources (fluorescent and solid-state) to replace 
incandescent light bulbs.
Industrial
Industrial energy use, in terms of primary energy sources, comprises 14 percent 
electricity, 34 percent natural gas, 36 percent oil, and small quantities of biomass and coal. 
The largest industrial use of electricity is for sodium chloride electrolysis to manufacture 
chlorine and sodium hydroxide, two large-volume industrial chemicals.
Industrial manufacturing operations have always depended heavily on their energy 
expenditures and, thus, have a history of energy-saving innovations. The chemical 
industry is the largest energy consumer in the manufacturing industries, both for 
electricity and for natural gas (as fuel and as feedstock for chemicals). High and volatile 
natural gas prices have been blamed for the loss of nearly 4 million manufacturing jobs in 
the United States between 2000 and 2010.26
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transportation
Transportation use constitutes 28 percent of the energy consumption in the United States, 
and it is almost completely oil-based (95 percent oil, 2 percent natural gas, 0.1 percent 
electric). As we said before, about two-thirds of US oil is imported, and 32 percent of 
the US anthropogenic CO2 is produced from transportation. One of the great challenges 
for transportation is to reduce its dependency on oil. This issue is being addressed by 
reducing fuel consumption (smaller and lighter cars, more efficient engines, gasoline-
electric hybrids) and by breaking the so far almost impenetrable boundaries between 
automobile transportation and electricity or natural gas.
The electricity-transportation boundary is being pierced by the introduction of plug-
in hybrids and all-electric vehicles. Plug-in hybrids are electrically propelled, with a 
gasoline engine that can be automatically turned on to recharge the battery but that is not 
mechanically connected to the drive train. (This is different from gasoline-electric hybrids, 
where electric- and gasoline-powered drive trains coexist.) Plug-in hybrid vehicles have 
a limited all-electric range, intended to cover the round-trip commuting range of most 
drivers (about 40 miles). Its gasoline engine serves as a range extender to perhaps 300 
miles, making these cars suitable for longer trips as well, despite their small batteries. 
The initial charge, covering the needs of about 80 percent of commuters, is supplied via 
plugging into the electric network, mostly overnight, eventually also providing a load-
leveling capability to the electric grid.
Mass-produced all-electric vehicles will eventually follow, pending battery 
developments. Technological development for electric vehicles is attracting dramatic 
worldwide activity. Issues include range, power, cost, safety, and speed and the availability 
of recharging. Electric batteries cannot be recharged instantly the way refilling a tank 
with gasoline can be accomplished, because of the very large electric currents that 
instantaneous recharging would require. One of the technological ventures involves 
developing standardized exchange terminals for electric vehicle batteries, where fully 
charged batteries can be inserted into the vehicle to replace the discharged batteries.
The natural gas–transportation boundary is, in part, being broken by hydrogen-powered 
fuel-cell vehicles. Although natural gas can be stored in portable high-pressure tanks just 
as hydrogen can and hydrogen will likely be generated from natural gas in a distributed 
fashion anyway, the hydrogen-powered fuel cell is thermodynamically more efficient than 
the Carnot cycle-limited internal combustion engine fueled by natural gas or hydrogen. 
Several fuel cell vehicle fleets are now running on most continents, and the vehicles seem 
to have evolved to deal with most requirements of performance, operability (including 
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operation in cold climates), safety, and in many cases, durability. Cost is the major issue 
that is expected to become gradually more competitive because of the learning curves 
of large-volume production. Nevertheless, large-scale deployment of fuel cell–powered 
vehicles is probably more than a decade away.
In the shorter run, natural gas can be used directly to fuel internal combustion engines. 
Compressed or liquefied natural gas powers about 11 million vehicles in the world today. 
These vehicles are located mostly in countries where prices for natural gas prices are lower 
than for gasoline, primarily in Asia (e.g., Pakistan) and South America (e.g., Argentina), 
but also in some European countries (e.g., Italy). The number of natural gas–driven 
vehicles is growing rapidly. Challenges include building a fueling infrastructure and 
designing cars with sufficient trunk size to accommodate the natural gas tanks.
Energy Savings
Important to the US energy picture, rejected energy is the fraction of primary energy 
source content discarded during energy extraction, conversion, distribution, and use. Data 
from the US Energy Information Administration, graphically displayed by the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory’s energy information group (see Figure 2.1),8 suggest that 
rejected energy amounts to about 58 percent of the energy content of the primary energy 
sources.
Energy savings often prove to be the “low-hanging fruit” in reducing energy 
consumption, pollution, and CO2 emissions while also saving money. Therefore, they tend 
to be the highest priority of most short- and mid-term energy infrastructure restructuring 
proposals.
There are two distinct modes of energy savings: through energy efficiency and through 
energy conservation. The term energy efficiency refers to achieving the same objective 
while consuming less energy; this is typically a technology-dependent outcome (example 
from transportation: hybrid propulsion in contrast to conventional vehicle propulsion). 
The term energy conservation refers to achieving energy savings by compromising 
the objective itself while reducing energy usage; this is primarily driven by perceived 
or real need and related human behavior (example from transportation: less driving, 
smaller cars). These two modes of energy savings are of course overlapping in actual life, 
demonstrating yet again that energy technology, economics, and societal considerations 
are inseparable.
Three levels of technologies are pertinent to energy savings: technologies now in use 
(example from construction: incandescent lighting), technologies available now but not 
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widely used (example from construction: fluorescent home lighting), and technologies 
under development (example from construction: LEDs for solid-state lighting). Again, 
implementation of a new technology is a complex function of technological, economic, 
and societal factors that, we argue, can best be understood in their integrated contexts, as 
the intersection of technology, economics, and societal factors.
The US National Academies Panel on Energy Efficiency Technologies, part of the 
America’s Energy Future project,2 recently examined the energy savings potential of the 
United States. The study was restricted to energy efficiency, leaving energy conservation 
out of the analysis. This scope limitation opens possibilities for the analysis of energy 
conservation, especially by social scientists.
The National Academies’ energy-efficiency report divides energy uses into three 
categories: construction, transportation, and industrial. The largest energy savings 
potential is in construction (insulation, lighting, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, 
and their integrated design and control). The report sets forth the remarkable conclusion 
that “if all the potential energy savings identified for residential and commercial buildings 
could be achieved” by 2020, the United States would not need any added electricity 
generating capacity.4(p2) A factor limiting the rate of implementation of energy-saving 
technologies is the long life cycle of buildings, demanding tough “replacement economics” 
from any new technologies.
In addition, the transportation category has significant technological potential 
remaining, ranging from advanced materials (lighter, stronger) to hybrid, plug-in hybrid, 
all-electric, and fuel-cell vehicles.
The third large energy-consuming category, industrial, is heterogeneous and complex. 
The major industrial energy consumers (aluminum, steel, chemicals) still appear to 
have untapped energy efficiencies; the implementation of these energy efficiencies is 
handicapped by the fact that large-scale industrial processes tend to have long life cycles 
(presenting challenging replacement economics if their capital has fully depreciated) and 
that energy consumption alone may not necessarily be their limiting economic dimension.
Energy savings are the result of complex interactions within the technological-
economic-societal intersection, involving both energy efficiency and energy conservation. 
The topic of energy savings represents new and intriguing opportunities for social science 
research with potential major impacts on the future of the US energy infrastructure.

Energy Economics
Chapter 3
For any technology to become a viable component of the energy infrastructure, it must be 
economically sustainable. A wide range of alternative energy technologies exist, but fossil 
fuels are still the lowest-cost option based on current market prices. In addition, because 
energy in the United States is relatively inexpensive—with 2007 energy expenditures 
having accounted for less than 9 percent of the gross national product27—energy efficiency 
initiatives have had difficulty gaining momentum.
One of the most important issues in considering the future of energy in the United 
States is determining how choices are made regarding the technologies that will be 
employed to meet growing energy demand. Market forces provide incentives for 
producing energy at the lowest cost while operating within the current public policy 
framework. However, in the presence of market distortions and impacts of energy 
production and consumption that are not reflected in the price to consumers, the market 
outcome will not necessarily lead to the most economically efficient mix of energy 
technologies. Consequently, at the heart of any discussion of our energy future are the 
following questions: What are the key factors influencing the cost of energy, specifically 
fossil fuels, in the United States, and to what extent do current prices deviate from the true 
social cost of these energy sources? For example, health and environmental externalities 
(unaccounted-for costs) and both implicit and explicit subsidies distort markets, leading 
to a suboptimal energy infrastructure from a societal perspective. It is vital to understand 
the magnitude of these effects and to consider the role of government policy in improving 
the economic efficiency of the United States’ energy future.
Energy economics encompasses a broad range of issues tightly interwoven with 
technological and societal considerations. In this chapter, we present a brief overview 
of the economics of the primary energy sources; the externalities of energy production, 
conversion, distribution, and use; behavioral energy economics; the role of government; 
and the modeling of energy markets and policies.
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Economics of Primary Energy Sources
To provide background on recent developments in primary energy sources markets, we 
briefly review the historical relationships among reserves, production, consumption, and 
prices for the depletable energy sources discussed in Chapter 2 (coal, oil, natural gas, and 
uranium). We then assess the externalities of fossil fuel production and use.
As is true with most natural resources, reserves are defined in terms of currently 
available technologies for economical recovery and use. On this basis, the world is unlikely 
to ever literally run out of fossil fuels or uranium; more likely, the recovery of these 
energy sources will become expensive enough to stimulate the use of alternative energy 
sources. Prices provide important signals regarding scarcity and influence investment 
across alternative energy technologies. The introduction of policies that influence the net 
prices observed by producers and consumers (e.g., to account for externalities) will alter 
incentives and result in a shift toward those primary energy sources that have become 
relatively less expensive under the policy.
reserves, production, Consumption, and prices
Coal
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that the United States had 
a demonstrated reserve base for coal resources of 488 billion tons at the beginning of 
2009.28 However, access to some coal is limited because of property rights, land use 
conflicts, and physical and environmental restrictions. In addition, the actual proportion 
of coal resources that can be recovered economically is affected by geologic features and 
the need to leave some coal as pillars to protect against mine collapse. In 2008, the average 
recovery rates for underground mines, surface mines, and overall were 57.9 percent, 90.1 
percent, and 79.6 percent, respectively.29 Accounting for these accessibility and recovery 
factors, the most recent EIA estimate is that the United States had total recoverable coal 
resources of 261 billion tons at the beginning of 2009. Global recoverable coal resources 
were estimated at about 911 billion tons in 2007. Based on these estimates, current rates 
of production, and the current technology for production and mining, the ratio of global 
coal reserves to global annual production (reserves-to-production ratio) is approximately 
130 years.28 The location and accessibility of these coal reserves suggest further tough 
choices for the United States in how far it is willing to go to recover this relatively cheap 
but environmentally problematic source of energy.
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Figure 3.1. Coal prices (in 2005 dollars), 1949–2009
Source: Adapted with permission from the US Energy Information Administration.30
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Coal production has been growing at a slower rate in recent years, partly because 
of more stringent environmental regulations, which have greatly reduced interest in 
building new coal-fired plants. In addition to existing air quality regulations, the potential 
for regulations limiting greenhouse gas emissions is contributing to a reduced rate of 
expansion of coal-fired power plants.
Coal prices peaked in 1975, bottomed in 2000, and have risen over the past few years 
(Figure 3.1). However, in its 2010 Annual Energy Outlook, EIA projects flat to slightly 
declining prices between 2010 and 2035.31 In the event that policies limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions are implemented, coal prices are likely to decrease even more as coal 
demand is reduced.
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Figure 3.2. US proved oil reserves, 1900–2008 
Source: Adapted with permission from the US Energy Information Administration.32
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Proved US oil reserves peaked in 1970 (Figure 3.2) and have decreased since then. 
Domestic US oil production peaked in the same year.
The 1973 and 1979 oil crises resulted in a temporary decrease in US petroleum 
consumption, but then consumption steadily increased between 1983 and 2006 
(Figure 3.3). The dramatic (and temporary) rise of oil prices in 2008 contributed to 
a recession, with a concomitant sharp decline in US oil consumption. Whether this 
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Figure 3.3. US oil consumption and oil prices, 1973–2010
Source: Adapted with permission from Williams, c2006–2009, http://wtrg.com/prices.htm.33
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decline will be temporary and when the new trends for electric vehicles will start to affect 
petroleum consumption remain to be seen.
In summer 2008, US spot crude oil prices rose dramatically and briefly peaked at 
$147 per barrel (not captured in the graph). By late December, they collapsed to $33 per 
barrel, a price drop of a factor of almost 4.5. As of late October 2010, spot oil prices were 
hovering around $82 per barrel. Such large price swings increase uncertainty and disrupt 
the economy.
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Figure 3.4. US oil production and oil imports, 1920–2010
Source: Adapted with permission from the US Energy Information Administration.34,35
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In March 2010, the US trade balance was about −$40.4 billion, composed of 
−$52.9 billion in goods and +$12.5 billion in services. Petroleum imports were 
−$24 billion, representing 59 percent of the US negative trade balance in that month. As 
domestic oil production continues its decline, oil imports have continued their steep rise 
(Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.5. Natural gas wellhead prices, 1976–2010
Source: Adapted with permission from the US Energy Information Administration.36
Natural Gas
As discussed in Chapter 2, natural gas will likely play an increasingly important role as a 
transitional hydrocarbon fuel.
US prices for natural gas have a history similar to that of oil prices: they varied by a 
factor of nearly 6 over the decade from 2000 to 2010, as shown in Figure 3.5. Some of the 
large price swings occurred in the wake of deregulation-induced speculation (e.g., the 
2000–2001 California energy crisis). Recent major upgrades in potential US natural gas 
reserves may contribute to improved stability in natural gas prices.
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Figure 3.6. Uranium (U3O8) prices, 1988–2010
Source: Adapted with permission from the Ux Consulting Company.41
Nuclear Energy
Compared with fossil fuels, uranium is more readily available to more countries. The 
largest reserves are found in Australia, which has more than one-fifth of the world’s total 
reserves; other large amounts of uranium are found in Kazakhstan, Russia, the United 
States, Canada, and South Africa.37 Currently, the availability of nuclear fuel imposes no 
limitation on nuclear power production, although such availability may later become a 
limiting factor.38,39 Moreover, the cost of nuclear fuel has not significantly affected the 
economics of nuclear energy, which is dominated instead by its high capital costs.40
Uranium prices (Figure 3.6) increased more than tenfold from June 2003 to May 2007. 
They have since declined substantially after briefly reaching a peak of $136 per pound of 
U3O8 in 2007 (not captured in the graph). Nonetheless, 2010 prices remain about 3 times 
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higher than the 1988–2003 average. There has been discussion of a potential “nuclear 
renaissance” in the United States and other parts of the Western world for the past decade. 
One way in which government support for greater nuclear development may manifest 
itself is through capital investment guarantees to protect against investment risks caused 
by potential fossil fuel and uranium price fluctuations.42,43
risks and Uncertainties
Many kinds of uncertainties can substantially affect energy supply, which may cause 
disruptions in the supply chain and have a negative impact on consumer welfare through 
reductions in the availability of energy services. Some of these disruptions include the 
following:
•	 supply	disruptions	related	to	production	safety,	such	as	the	2010	Massey	Energy	
mine explosion in West Virginia, which killed 29 miners, and the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon offshore oil drilling rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, which killed 11 oil 
rig workers and caused a massive oil spill;
•	 natural	disasters,	such	as	hurricanes	Katrina	and	Rita	in	2005;
•	 price	instabilities	in	commodity	primary	energy	sources;
•	 oil	crises	in	the	form	of	coupled	price	and	supply	instabilities,	such	as	the	1973	OPEC	
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo and the 1979 
Iranian Revolution;
•	 international	disputes,	such	as	the	2006	Russia-Ukraine	gas	dispute	and	the	2007	
Russia–Belarus oil dispute;
•	 sanctions,	such	as	those	currently	in	place	against	Iran	and,	earlier,	against	Iraq	and	
Libya;
•	 terrorism,	such	as	the	terrorist	attacks	of	September	11,	2001;	and
•	 warfare	in	oil-producing	regions,	such	as	the	1990	Persian	Gulf	War	and	the	2003	
Iraq War.
Nations can mitigate the impact of energy supply uncertainties by establishing strategic 
energy reserves. In the case of oil, for example, all 28 members of the International 
Energy Agency hold a minimum of 90 days’ worth of their oil imports in strategic reserve. 
According to the US Department of Energy (DOE), the United States has 726.6 million 
barrels in its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) inventory as of November 30, 2010.44 
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DOE indicates that the volume in the SPR is equivalent to 75 days’ worth of imported 
oil. However, the United States fulfills its commitment to maintaining 90 days of import 
protection through a combination of the SPR and industry stocks.
Externalities
Externalities are the benefits or costs associated with market transactions that are not 
enjoyed or borne by market participants but affect the well-being of third parties outside 
the transaction. One of the most pervasive externalities is the environmental pollution 
created by energy extraction and consumption, where neither the energy producer nor the 
consumer bears the full social cost.
In the absence of externalities, market transaction costs and benefits to society equal 
the costs and benefits to the parties of the transaction. Thus, without externalities, the 
equilibrium price and quantity determined by the market maximizes both private and 
social net benefits. At quantities lower than the equilibrium, the value to consumers of an 
additional unit exceeds the cost of producing that unit, so there are gains to expanding 
production. Conversely, at quantities higher than the equilibrium level, the marginal cost 
of production exceeds the marginal value to consumers. In this case, without externalities 
any interventions in the market reduce total net benefits to society by moving the 
market away from the free market equilibrium. However, in cases where externalities do 
accompany market transactions, the free market equilibrium results in levels of economic 
activity above or below the socially optimal level. Market participants, in these situations, 
have no incentive to take into account these effects on third parties or the society at 
large. This supports a rationale for government intervention to improve total welfare by 
instituting policies that cause the effects on third parties to be considered.
When a negative externality occurs, the costs to society of additional production and 
consumption, or the marginal social cost, exceed the private cost, or the price of the good 
or service. In other words, the privately optimal level of production and consumption 
exceeds the socially optimal level. Consequently, proponents of a carbon tax argue that 
taxing society for the pollution externality is a way to bring fossil fuel energy consumption 
closer to its socially optimal level.
Conversely, with a positive externality, the marginal social benefit, which accrues to 
society through the additional production and consumption, exceeds the marginal private 
benefit, or the price of the good or service. In this situation, the resulting privately optimal 
level of production and consumption is too low relative to the socially optimal value.
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Government intervention can place a value on the externalities by, for example, 
taxing those activities with negative externalities and subsidizing those with positive 
externalities. Such intervention causes individuals and firms to “internalize” the 
externalities and consider them when making their private decisions. A policy that led 
to complete internalization of all externalities would result in privately optimal market 
outcomes that are also socially optimal.
Recognition of the importance of the environmental externalities of market production 
and consumption in socially optimal resource allocation constitutes one of the 
foundations of environmental economics. Energy production from fossil fuels imposes 
major negative environmental and human health impacts through, for example, emissions 
of CO2, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, fine particulate matter, and vapors of mercury, as 
well as deposits of heavy metals in coal ash and of coal ash itself. Without intervention, 
fossil fuel–derived energy use will exceed the socially optimal level because energy users 
will not internalize the pollution externalities. Consequently, the need to address the 
production of multiple pollutants during the combustion of fossil fuels makes the study of 
climate and other environmental policies affecting energy markets a major focus of energy 
economics.
Numerous regulations require controls on emissions from electricity producers 
and from transportation use. However, these emission controls have not targeted 
CO2 reductions, at least not at the federal level. This situation may change as the US 
government considers regulatory and legislative approaches to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions over time. Because of their dominant role in US CO2 emissions (see Chapter 2), 
energy production and consumption would be among the most affected sectors of the US 
economy, according to economic analyses of the impacts of US policy proposals that have 
been considered as of late 2010.45
Energy-related externalities were considered in the previously cited 2010 report of 
the National Research Council titled Hidden Cost of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of 
Energy Production and Use.5 The committee quantified the hidden (unpriced) effects of 
health damages from air pollution associated with electricity generation and motor vehicle 
transportation, estimating them at about $120 billion per year. Because the committee 
believed that some damages could not be meaningfully quantified, this figure excludes 
potential damages from climate change, potential harm to ecosystems, the effects of 
mercury in the air from coal combustion, and risks to national security. The computed 
externalities, as well as any additional (not computed) negative effects on climate, 
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ecosystems, and national security, indicate that petroleum-dependent transportation 
incurs a significantly higher societal cost than the at-pump fuel prices reflect.
Oil-related hidden costs were addressed by a 2007 report of the National Defense 
Council Foundation.46 Elements of its analysis, in 2005 figures, included
•	 oil-related	defense	expenditures	of	$49	billion	per	year,
•	 loss	of	current	economic	activity,	in	terms	of	gross	national	product,	due	to	capital	
outflow of $160 billion per year,
•	 losses	in	tax	revenues	of	$13	billion	per	year,	and
•	 job	losses	numbering	about	830,000.
Greene and Ahmad of Oak Ridge National Laboratory addressed hidden energy costs 
in a 2005 report.47 They calculated the costs of
•	 the	transfer	of	wealth	from	the	United	States	to	oil-producing	countries,
•	 the	potential	economic	loss	due	to	oil	prices	being	elevated	above	competitive	market	
levels, and
•	 disruption	costs	caused	by	sudden,	large	oil	price	movements.
According to their estimate, oil dependence cost the US economy $3.6 trillion (in 2000 
dollars) from 1970 to 2005.
Behavioral Energy Economics
Market prices provide consumers of energy resources with incentives to choose privately 
optimal levels of energy efficiency and energy use. Maximizing economic efficiency 
of energy use, which would maximize net benefits to society, does not generally imply 
maximizing energy efficiency. Energy efficiency refers to the quantity of energy used per 
unit of output. Although changes in production and consumption that reduce energy use 
per unit output may reduce energy costs, they are likely to require increases in the use of 
other inputs per unit of output (e.g., capital, labor, and materials). 
Changes to reduce energy use per unit of output come at a marginal cost that is 
expected to increase as energy efficiency improves and it becomes increasingly difficult 
and costly to further increase energy efficiency. A large literature reasons that private 
economic decisions related to energy production and consumption may not result in 
economically efficient outcomes.48 For example, consumers may not be fully informed of 
alternatives or their cost-effectiveness, or they can be shortsighted or capital constrained. 
Markets may not lead to efficient outcomes in the presence of market failures, such as 
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resulting from imperfect information, or in the presence of externalities, such as those 
concerning the environment. In addition to market failures, private decision making may 
lead to “behavioral failures” that lead to deviations from cost-minimizing behavior.49
Consumers may be relatively unresponsive to price changes in their use of residential 
energy, particularly electricity, in part because they lack or ignore information on the 
quantity of energy being used by individual devices in their homes. Therefore, provision, 
or clearer articulation, of information about these externalities to consumers may reduce 
the environmental externalities of energy production and consumption.
Few consumers know what primary energy sources are used to generate the electricity 
they use or how much energy is used to manufacture the products they purchase, let 
alone what the associated emissions, environmental, and health impacts are. One strategy 
for educating consumers is to place information about life-cycle emissions on consumer 
products so that consumers can consider emissions associated with alternative products as 
part of their purchase decision.
Behavioral failure refers to systematic biases in decision making that lead to too little 
investment in energy efficiency with respect to the cost-minimizing level. The argument 
for the presence of behavioral failures in energy markets comes largely from the literature 
of cognitive psychology to help explain private decision making. As described in the 
National Academies’ report, three primary sources of potential behavioral failures have 
been applied to energy efficiency4: prospect theory, bounded rationality, and heuristic 
decision making.
Prospect theory suggests that consumers evaluate potential gains and losses in their 
welfare with respect to a reference point, usually the status quo. It also argues that changes 
in welfare from a loss of a given magnitude are greater than changes associated with a 
gain of an equivalent magnitude. This phenomenon could lead to greater resistance to 
behavioral change than theories of rational cost-minimizing behavior imply when there is 
uncertainty regarding the welfare outcome.
Bounded rationality and heuristic decision making both rely on consumers’ facing 
cognitive limitations that may lead to deviations from pure rationality; however, empirical 
evidence is limited on behavioral failures as related to energy use and energy efficiency. 
Consequently, whether cognitive limitations lead to systematic biases in decision making 
and, if so, whether such biases would lead to under- or over-investment in energy 
efficiency remain unclear. Much more research is required before the United States can 
understand and eventually harness the behavioral economics of the energy conundrum.
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Role of Government
An important question related to energy economics is what role should government 
fill in developing and deploying new energy technologies. Throughout history, US 
administrations have taken approaches ranging from nearly “hands off,” as when they 
allowed industries to self-regulate safety and environmental standards, to much more 
active regulatory stances, as when they mandated renewable-energy portfolios.
The government has far-reaching responsibilities in managing the country’s energy 
markets. The role of a national energy policy is to address US energy planning, generation, 
transmission, and use.
Governmental responsibilities include the following:
•	 appropriately	regulating	commercial	energy	activities;
•	 regulating	energy	efficiency	and	emission	standards,	including	those	affecting	climate	
change;
•	 issuing	instructions	for	government-owned	energy-sector	assets	and	organizations;
•	 conducting	geological	surveys;
•	 funding	and	conducting	basic	and	applied	energy	research;
•	 regulating	taxes,	exemptions,	and	subsidies	associated	with	energy	generation,	
conversion, and use;
•	 enacting	security	and	foreign	policy	measures	such	as	treaties,	alliances,	and	trade	
agreements; and
•	 if	necessary	for	security,	providing	for	military	presence	or	even	conducting	warfare.
State, regional, and municipal government entities often have their own regulations. 
Typically, these regulations are coordinated with, or consistent with, regulations at the 
federal level.
Policy issues often transcend scientific, technological, or even economic 
considerations such as protection of jobs in certain industries or geographic locations. 
These considerations have to be implemented in the context of a democratic society. 
(Contemplating how energy-related policies may evolve in nondemocratic societies 
is interesting: Although their governments may be freer to enact far-reaching energy 
policies, they are also more exposed to potential catastrophic failures associated with 
rapidly mandated or misdirected shifts in energy technologies.)
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energy Subsidies
Energy is a highly subsidized commodity throughout most of the world. In few countries 
do energy consumers pay what most economists would consider the full social cost of 
energy. Most governments invest heavily in energy research and development (R&D) 
and in energy infrastructure development. Funded from the general tax base, these 
investments typically are not reflected in the final price of energy; instead, the final price 
arises from capital costs, depreciation, and variable operating costs, with externalities 
remaining unaccounted for.
A significant part of the US defense budget can be viewed as an energy subsidy not 
reflected in the price of imported energy. A key mission for the US military is to provide 
energy security by minimizing worldwide production disruptions and protecting shipping 
lanes to ensure the flow of oil and gas imports. These costs may not be fully allocated 
among the beneficiary countries.
Another important consideration concerns subsidies. Coal, oil, natural gas, and 
uranium are converted to energy carriers, such as electricity and fuels, in large-scale 
processes with established capital and operating economics, as well as established ratios 
of fixed to variable cost components. Alternative energy technologies, based on renewable 
(often low-cost and inexhaustible) energy sources, tend to result in levelized energy costs 
heavily dominated by the capital component, as exemplified by solar and wind energy 
farms. Because of the long time span required for such investments in alternative energy 
to break even, they represent a significant investment risk. Governments can mitigate 
this risk by using subsidies, tax breaks, tax exemptions, and investment guarantees. 
Nonselective subsidies make alternative energy sources and energy efficiency options 
less cost-competitive, whereas selective subsidies (e.g., of specific alternative energy 
technologies) may have undesired or unanticipated consequences. A recent example for 
the unintended consequences of selective subsidies has been the hotly debated effect of 
corn-derived ethanol subsidies on food prices.
regulation
The government also fulfills a major role in the regulation of energy markets, largely 
because of the presence of numerous key externalities in this sector, as described earlier. 
These externalities argue strongly for public intervention in energy markets to improve 
economic efficiency, ensure energy availability, maintain public safety, manage the 
tendency toward local natural monopolies in electricity transmission, and ameliorate 
pollution concerns.
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Numerous regulations substantially affect both current and future energy markets with 
competing interests, often with fundamental tensions between short-term and long-term 
goals. In addition, a mix of regulations may focus on encouraging efficiency (e.g., energy 
efficiency standards) or on increasing energy supply (e.g., mandated use of advanced 
renewable transportation fuels). The many existing regulations interact in complex ways 
to influence private incentives for energy exploration, investment in R&D, conservation, 
mitigation of environmental impacts, and other aspects of energy production and 
consumption.
In recent years, several state governments have moved to require the use of renewable 
energy for electricity generation through renewable portfolio standards. California has 
instituted a low-carbon fuel standard for transportation fuels. The federal government 
also promulgated a rule requiring an increased use of renewable transportation fuels that 
began in February 2010, which will significantly accelerate the use of renewable fuels 
between 2010 and 2022. When the rule is fully phased in, volume requirements will reach 
36 billion gallons of renewable transportation fuels per year.
Recent discussion has addressed further increases in corporate average fuel efficiency 
(CAFE) standards for new vehicles.
A primary goal behind many of these policies is to reduce US dependence on imported 
energy sources and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, these policies may 
affect emissions of “criteria” air pollutants (the six identified by the Clear Air Act are 
ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and lead) and 
additional hazardous air pollutants.
Another set of potential regulations aims to reduce CO2 emissions. Because energy 
use accounts for most US CO2 emissions, any policy mandating their reduction is 
expected to have substantial effects on the future size and structure of the energy sector 
and on the mix of energy sources employed. Thus, enacting a US CO2 reduction policy 
could be expected to have substantial influence on the future use of energy sources (coal 
versus natural gas versus renewable energy) and energy use itself (investments in energy 
efficiency versus behavior change).
technology Development
The theoretical basis for government’s role in market activity lies in the concept of market 
failure. As mentioned before, market failure is typically attributed to monopoly power, 
imperfect information, externalities, and public goods. For example, the balance between 
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monopoly power and economics of scale is continually being assessed through antitrust 
legislation. Explicitly asserting market failure to justify government’s role in R&D activity, 
however, is a relatively recent phenomenon in public policy.
Market failure, particularly technological or innovation market failure, results from 
conditions that prevent organizations from fully realizing or appropriating the benefits 
created by their investments. This situation happens when conditions prevent the R&D-
investing firm’s full appropriation of the benefits from a marketable technology developed 
through the R&D process.
Patents are one of the more viable mechanisms for helping innovators reap the 
benefits of their research. Nevertheless, patents are imperfect and, typically, other firms 
in the market or in related markets will realize some of the profits from the innovation. 
Consequently, the R&D-investing firm will calculate that the marginal benefits it can 
receive from a unit investment in R&D will be less than what could be earned if all 
benefits could be fully appropriated. As a result, an underinvestment in R&D ensues with 
respect to what would have been optimal from a social perspective. Stated another way, 
the R&D-investing firm may determine that its private rate of return fails to exceed its 
private “hurdle” rate (i.e., the firm’s minimum acceptable rate of return); it may, therefore, 
decide against undertaking socially valuable R&D if it is not economically valuable for the 
company. The result may be a shift of R&D investments into second-best technological 
solutions from the societal perspective.
Several factors can lead to a firm’s perception that its expected rate of return will fall 
below its hurdle rate:50
•	 High	technical	risk	may	cause	market	failure	because,	even	when	the	firm	is	
“successful,” the private returns may fall short of the private hurdle rates.
•	 High	technical	risk	can	relate	to	high	commercial	or	market	risk	when	the	requisite	
R&D is highly capital-intensive. The investment may require too much capital for 
a firm to feel comfortable with the outlay; therefore, the firm may not make the 
investment, even though both it and society might have benefitted more if it had.
•	 Many	R&D	projects	are	characterized	by	a	lengthy	time	interval	until	a	commercial	
product reaches the market.
•	 Not	uncommonly,	the	scope	of	potential	markets	is	broader	than	the	scope	of	the	
individual firm’s market strategies, so the firm may not perceive economic benefits 
from all potential market applications of the technology.
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•	The	evolving	nature	of	markets	requires	investment	in	combinations	of	technologies	
that, if currently extant, would reside in different, nonintegrated industries. 
Because such conditions often transcend the R&D strategy of individual firms, such 
investments will likely remain unrealized.
•	 In	some	situations,	the	technology	may	make	assignment	of	intellectual	property	
rights difficult.
•	 Industrial	structure	can	raise	the	cost	of	market	entry	for	applications	of	the	
technology.
•	 In	some	situations,	the	complexity	of	a	technology	makes	buyer-seller	agreement	
about product performance costly.
These factors, individually or in combination, can create barriers to innovation and, 
therefore, because of the technological market failure, lead to a private underinvestment 
in R&D. As a result, frequently a role for government is to support the development 
of technologies that have large spillover benefits (e.g., by providing information that 
will be valuable to numerous parties and will lower their costs of further R&D and 
commercialization) or are characterized by high risk but high potential return.
The main criticism aimed at government-supported R&D is that the government 
is then picking the next generation of technologies. Because resources are limited, the 
government develops and implements criteria by which it selects technologies and 
processes to fund. The question remains, however: Does the government have better 
information than the private sector on the potential success, both technical and economic, 
of technological alternatives? The persistence of this question has meant that the role of 
government has traditionally been focused on basic, precompetitive R&D, from which 
knowledge spillovers are noncontroversial. Basic R&D has historically been considered 
to have many attributes of a public good; hence, there is a clear role for government in 
promoting the optimal social level of basic R&D.
In the past, the government has hesitated to venture into areas of applied research 
that are too close to commercialization of technology. However, this hesitance has been 
eroding in recent years because of concerns that, without government funding, the 
movement of new technologies from the laboratory or university to commercial products 
will end in the “valley of death” (i.e., the time span of negative cash flow in the life cycle of 
a technology).51
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Modeling Energy Markets and Policies
When energy companies consider future investments or policy makers propose new 
regulations for energy markets, they typically turn to energy modelers to evaluate the 
potential impacts of their decisions. Energy modelers generally develop and apply 
models that combine information from a wide variety of disciplines, such as chemical 
and mechanical engineering, geology, transportation, and agriculture. They predict how 
markets may respond to changes in conditions. These models of the energy sector and, in 
some cases, the entire economy are useful tools in policy investigations because they can 
start from known conditions in energy markets, add new information on technologies or 
regulations, and evaluate how the future may look.
Energy models vary significantly in their focus and capabilities. Broadly speaking, the 
models can be characterized as either top-down or bottom-up. Top-down models tend to 
concentrate on macroeconomic drivers in energy markets and on interactions between 
energy and the rest of the economy. Meanwhile, they sacrifice details about the specific 
technologies that produce and consume energy. Bottom-up models have more of an 
engineering orientation and focus on representing individual technologies to the extent 
feasible in what is still an aggregated framework. However, they are less suited for an 
examination of forces driving overall energy supply and demand. Some efforts have been 
made to combine these modeling techniques; research on the best methods of integrating 
the two approaches continues.
The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) has conducted numerous collaborative 
exercises among modelers to evaluate the predictions of energy models and how they can 
vary across individual models. Published literature from this process explored the possible 
economic effects of US, European, and international climate change mitigation policies.48 
Other EMF projects have explored issues such as global natural gas or petroleum markets.
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) uses the National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS). NEMS combines several detailed modules representing specific aspects 
of energy markets to estimate future energy demands as a function of expected changes in 
economic growth and technological development. NEMS also helps formulate responses 
to requests from federal government agencies for policy analyses.
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Climate Change Division uses a 
combination of the bottom-up Integrated Planning Model of electricity production52 and 
two top-down macroeconomic models: the Intertemporal General Equilibrium model53 
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and RTI’s Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy (ADAGE) model54 (see text 
box for additional description of ADAGE). This combination of models has been used in 
EPA responses to congressional requests for legislative analyses.
Some elements of these models, and the underlying drivers of their predictions, 
are inherently uncertain. Many of the findings depend on expected economic growth. 
Similarly, analysts must make assumptions about the costs and availabilities of energy 
production technologies on the basis of the best available engineering data. For example, 
ADAGE Integrated Model Structure 
ADAGE is a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model capable of investigating 
economic policies at the international, national, US regional, and US state levels. CGE models 
such as ADAGE combine economic theory and empirical data to estimate policy effects, while 
accounting for all interactions among businesses and consumers.
ADAGE typically solves in 5-year time intervals from 2005 to around 2050 and can be used 
to explore dynamic effects of many types of energy, environmental, and trade policies. Of 
particular note is its ability to investigate climate change mitigation policies at a range of 
geographic scales.
ADAGE is designed with an integrated, modular structure (see figure at right ). Each module 
relies on different data sources and has different geographic scopes, but all have the same 
overarching theoretical structure. The internally consistent, integrated framework connecting 
ADAGE’s modules allows its components to use relevant policy findings from other modules 
with broader geographic coverage, while avoiding computational issues that preclude solving 
for all US states and world nations simultaneously. 
The comprehensive framework of ADAGE begins with the international module. Based on Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data, this component of ADAGE allows the model to conduct 
international policy investigations of any group of nations included in its database. After the 
GTAP data and economic/energy forecasts from EIA enter the model structure, policies can be 
examined.
From these studies, findings on prices of traded goods and, in the case of climate change 
mitigation policies, greenhouse gas permit prices can be passed to the US Regional Module 
(based on IMPLAN economic data and EIA energy data).
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estimated macroeconomic impacts of climate policies depend critically on assumptions 
about advanced electricity generation technologies, such as nuclear energy and “clean 
coal” with carbon capture and storage. These types of data are always subject to debate, 
but energy-sector models may help decision makers evaluate a range of assumptions 
that capture most of the possible outcomes and provide information on the potential 
differences in direction and the relative magnitude of impacts under alternative scenarios.
Traded goods prices and greenhouse gas allowance prices
Economic/energy data and forecasts enter model structure
After generating a baseline, new policies are included and results are estimated
International
• GTAP/IEA Data 
• WEO Forecast
US Regional
• Implan/EIA Data 
• AEO Forecasts
Single Country
(small open economy)
• Costa Rica 
• Brazil (4 regions)
• Production Functions 
• Household Utility Functions
• Intertemporal Dynamics 
• Elasticity Parameters
Greenhouse 
Gas Policies
• International
• US National 
• US Regional
• US States
Macroeconomic 
Policies
• Electricity 
• Environment  
• Energy
• Trade
Greenhouse Gas Results
Emissions and Allowance Prices
(CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, SF6)
Macroeconomic Results
GDP, Welfare, Output, Trade 
Investment, Energy ($ and Btu)
Model Structure
Figure 3.7. ADAGE model structure
 ADAGE =  Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy model 
 AEO  =  Annual Energy Outlook (EIA report)
 BTU  =  British thermal units 
 EIA  =  Energy Information Administration 
 GDP  =  gross domestic product 
 GTAP  =  Global Trade Analysis Project 
 IEA =  International Energy Agency 
 IMPLAN  =  Impact Analysis for Planning (model) 
 WEO  =  World Energy Outlook (IEA report)
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Although considerable improvements in our ability to model energy markets have 
been made over time, there remain many uncertainties regarding consumer preferences 
and behavior and room for substantial improvement. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, transportation is responsible for about one-third of all energy consumed in the 
United States, with personal vehicles representing about 60 percent of that total. Factors 
influencing the choices of personal vehicles remain poorly understood. Such choices often 
depend on factors other than the economic cost of transportation, which makes analyzing 
them in macroeconomic models problematic. Modeling and predicting transportation-
related energy economics become even more complicated when energy-sector models 
have to incorporate plug-in hybrid or electric vehicles not yet in widespread use. Such 
issues could be informed by collecting additional survey data about consumer preferences.
Other choices by households remain equally unexplained in current energy modeling. 
Energy efficiency, in particular, is considered an important tool for meeting future energy 
goals and complying with possible climate policies. Engineering cost data can help specify 
technological options for efficiency improvements with relative ease, but adoption of 
these technologies is not well understood. Similarly, additional information would have 
to be collected to inform energy models with respect to consumers’ possible reactions to 
new kinds of technologies—such as smart electric grids—necessary to improve energy 
efficiency.
Energy economics and modeling has made considerable strides in recent years in 
improving our understanding of the inherent trade-offs associated with alternative energy 
sources available at different prices, levels of supply risk, and externalities. However, much 
remains to be learned about human behavior and development of public policy. In the 
following chapter, we examine social dimensions of the energy challenge facing the United 
States that are not well understood. An improved understanding of these issues will 
provide valuable insights into consumer decision making, development of public policy, 
and energy model structure and parameterization.
Societal Dimension of America’s 
Energy Challenge
Chapter 4
The Mojave Desert in California is among the premier locations in the United States 
for solar and wind energy plants. Its high rates of peak sunshine and proximity to power 
transmission lines and population centers spurred hundreds of millions of dollars in 
investments at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. 
Power companies making these investments sought to supplement their traditional fuel-
burning plants with renewable sources.
Yet in late 2009 ambitious plans to build 13 more wind and solar “farms” in the 
Mojave Desert appeared to be scuttled by the opposition of environmentalists and some 
of the state’s elected officials. They called further development of energy plants, even 
“clean” energy like solar and wind, a threat to the desert’s landscape and ecology. The 
conflict divided the environmental movement and aggravated traditional battles between 
developers and ecologists.55
Meanwhile, union leaders seeking to secure construction jobs for their members 
supported the development and opposed liberal elected officials whom they normally 
support. Equally subject to such ironies, conservatives opposed to government spending 
found themselves at odds with other conservative business interests looking to the 
government for critical investment in technology or tax relief to support fledgling 
enterprises.
Like the controversies over the Mojave Desert site, the choices confronting the United 
States will be socially, politically, and economically complex. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
alternative energy technologies such as wind and solar power have enormous potential 
and have been developed into viable alternatives for generating electricity and for other 
uses. Because they do not directly contribute to pollution or CO2 emissions, and do 
not raise energy security concerns, they are far less prone to the externalities problems 
detailed in Chapter 3. Wind and solar plants must, however, be deployed in specific places 
and communities, where (as illustrated above) competing values and complex politics can 
frustrate even the most compelling technical achievements. 
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Studying the way forward in meeting the country’s energy challenges means developing 
a better understanding of the social contexts in which individuals and institutions 
make energy decisions. The nation has a great deal of information about the energy 
infrastructure and technologies, and energy economics are well developed. What is 
lacking is an organized evidence base about people’s attitudes and behaviors with respect 
to options for energy use. Little is known, for instance, about how sociodemographic 
factors, cultural or religious views, or developments outside the United States influence 
the choices that people or organizations in this country make about energy. 
This chapter sets forth what is already known about this third dimension to America’s 
energy future: the social constructs and societal activities that interact with both 
technology and economics to give us the energy infrastructure that we have today and the 
options for tomorrow. We first cover largely domestic issues, such as public opinion and 
engagement; we also examine the complex geopolitical considerations that influence US 
actions in both the public and private sector. Finally, we raise a broad set of considerations 
involving social justice and ethics. Then, in Chapter 5, we lay out a research agenda to fill 
the many gaps in our understanding of the societal factors so crucial to achieving progress 
and making sensible personal and policy choices in the years ahead.
Further Examples of the Impact of Societal Factors
 The Mohave Desert account at the outset of this chapter is but one illustration of 
the interplay of technology, economics, and social factors in fostering, or in this case 
impeding, efforts to expand America’s energy options. It is by no means the only example, 
however.
For instance, efforts in the early 2000s were under way to build a wind farm off Cape 
Cod, a 24-square-mile project that would be the country’s first offshore wind power plant. 
These efforts were challenged in early 2010 when the National Park Service declared 
Nantucket Sound eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The Park 
Service was responding to a request from two Massachusetts Native American tribes. 
The tribes claimed that the turbines would interfere with tribal rituals for welcoming the 
sun as it rose across the sound and would disturb the tribes’ burial grounds.56 In short, 
decisions about energy sources may be made in a social context with deep historical roots, 
one involving long-established ethnic and religious rights.
The history of nuclear power in the United States provides another example of the 
complex interactions among technology, subsidies, externalities, uncertainties, and issues 
concerning public perception and imperfect information. Technical innovation and 
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economic feasibility, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, have not sufficed to ensure nuclear 
power’s development as a primary source of power in the United States.
Nuclear research and development was funded by the government originally for 
military purposes. As with many defense technologies, use in commercial applications 
was a spillover benefit to society. The promise of power “too cheap to meter” made nuclear 
power attractive from both an economic and an energy security perspective. However, 
social concerns over safety significantly increased construction and operating costs, and 
difficulties in locating new plants because of environmental and “not in my backyard” 
issues led to a decline in the industry.
No new plants in the United States were constructed for three decades. However, in 
2010 new plants were being built in Europe, and proposals for new reactors were being 
generated in the United States. Seemingly, social attitudes were converging with advances 
in technology and realities of the costs of alternative fuel sources to enable nuclear power 
proponents and energy companies to move ahead in this sector.
The most controversial element of nuclear power remains waste management, and 
this issue, too, entails technical, economic, and social factors. Two competing waste 
management approaches exist. One involves open fuel cycle and the other closed fuel 
cycle (reprocessing) technologies, discussed in Chapter 2.
In 1997 the United States officially banned the reprocessing of spent fuel from 
nuclear reactors. At the time, the government cited two main reasons for the ban. First, 
reprocessing may generate weapons-grade fuel (plutonium) and could lead to nuclear 
proliferation or terrorism. Second, US reprocessing historically had proven to be 
environmentally dangerous because of radioactive contamination.
Over the past 30 years, however, France and other countries have shown that 
reprocessing can be environmentally safe. No security breaches have occurred with 
any weapons-grade fuel, but the waste still presents a security risk, and the reprocessed 
material is concentrated and more difficult to manage. The lack of commercial technology 
for constructing a viable breeder reactor (discussed in Chapter 2) prevents realization of 
the full economic benefits of reprocessing.
Consequently, no clear technological or economic winner has emerged in the 
reprocessing debate. The US nuclear industry has little incentive to pursue breeder reactor 
technology, because the federal government subsidizes existing waste management 
practices. In addition, politically charged issues surrounding nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism, public safety, and the environment support the status quo and make change 
difficult.
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The US open fuel cycle system will likely continue, on the promise of future 
development of a long-term, cost-effective system to manage unprocessed nuclear waste. 
However, the solution of storing waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which has been 
extremely controversial, is currently on hold; moreover, the Yucca Mountain site may 
already be too small to hold the existing US stockpile of high-level waste. Consequently, 
US nuclear power plants continue to rely on on-site waste storage. Similarly, France and 
other European countries will likely continue with their own system, on the promise of 
eventual commercial viability of breeder reactors.
Another example of the importance of societal factors in the energy debate is the 
explosion on April 20, 2010, of the Deepwater Horizon semisubmersible oil rig 41 miles 
offshore Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico, which resulted in 11 deaths and a massive oil 
spill. Offshore drilling represents a true technical, economic, and societal dilemma. The 
technology is complex at depths of 5,000 feet and beyond, the oil-drilling definition of 
“deep.” However, failure to exploit offshore oil might lead to even higher levels of use of 
imported oil, exacerbating the related military, security, and economic issues.
These kinds of low-probability, high-consequence disasters cannot be completely 
avoided (airline disasters come to mind as an analogue). Government control of deep-
water offshore drilling operations is only partially effective, because the government is 
neither fully familiar with the technology nor in possession of the required equipment and 
manpower. Perhaps the most likely outcome of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe will be 
a resumption of deep-water offshore drilling after substantial tightening of both company 
practices and governmental regulations, coming after multibillion-dollar damages, 
corresponding claims, and their economic consequences. The outcomes of this disaster 
will be the result of not only economic and technical factors, but also societal choices and 
contexts.
These examples suggest only some of the ways that our energy options will be 
constrained as much by the way society operates as by the way science operates. For this 
reason, researchers must understand the following:
•	 how	much	members	of	the	public	know	about	present	and	future	energy	choices	and	
the impacts of those choices, and how they obtained that knowledge;
•	 how	world	and	market	developments	influence	public	opinion;	
•	 how	energy	politics	operates	domestically	and	in	American	foreign	policy;
•	 how	public	policy	can	influence	individual	behavior,	and	vice	versa;	and
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•	 how	the	United	States	can	better	prepare	for	whatever	future	energy	infrastructure	
the country develops, including better understanding the homeland security 
implications of our energy future.
We explore these concepts here by examining public attitudes, knowledge, and opinions 
on energy options available to the United States, or possibly available in the near future, 
and the domestic and geopolitical contexts in which energy decisions are made. We also 
investigate the research possibilities related to energy shortages, which are taken up again 
in Chapter 5. The United States has met its past energy challenges with relatively little 
permanent disruption to its social and economic development. This record of success 
offers encouragement that the nation will solve the current crisis, but it is not a guarantee.
Broad Agreements in Public Opinion
Americans’ attitudes toward energy are rooted in broad agreement on three concurrent 
concepts:
1. instability of supply, or the notion that domestic supplies of currently used energy 
sources are inadequate, forcing the United States into reliance on unstable foreign 
sources;
2. scarcity, or the notion that global supplies of fossil fuels are intrinsically limited and 
that the horizon for the depletion of reserves of key fuels is fast approaching; and
3. environmental impact, or the notion that the consumption of fossil fuels is the source 
of environmental degradation, ranging from the health effects of air pollution to 
effects of CO2 emissions on climate.
On none of these points are Americans unanimous: each is contested, sometimes 
vigorously. Some Americans believe that increased oil drilling or other strategies can 
help the United States achieve energy independence, while some Americans think that 
the decline of fossil fuel supplies is not a crisis, because other fuels will rapidly develop to 
replace fossil fuels well before fossil fuels are exhausted. Moreover, Americans continue to 
debate global climate change. Even where disagreement persists, these three issues have 
nonetheless entered the American public mind in a profound, lasting way.
Instability of Supply
Americans have witnessed how the uneven distribution of fossil fuel resources across 
different countries has influenced America’s foreign relations for more than a century. 
It has had an acute impact since at least the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 to 1974, which 
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was in response to Western support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The 1979 oil crisis 
stemming from the Iranian revolution followed.
The political situation in the Middle East, centered on the questions of the Palestinian-
Israeli coexistence and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, is inextricable from the United 
States’ need to secure the country’s access to oil fields in Arab countries. Rivalry between 
the United States, Russia, and China for regional and international influence is tied as 
well to energy access. Although the United States can rely on considerable domestic fuel 
supplies, particularly coal, it is far from self-sufficient.
The specter of a sudden energy crisis arising from a world event, such as the outbreak 
of war or a terrorist attack, hovers over American attitudes toward energy sources and 
policy. The concern has, in fact, influenced societal perspectives for several decades, 
reinforcing the notion that the United States’ access to energy is highly contingent, even 
fragile, and therefore in need of safeguarding. Consequently, US taxpayers assume a heavy 
burden for the large military expenditures associated with guaranteeing the safety of oil 
production and transportation and with protecting the public from terrorism.
Scarcity
Regardless of the location of energy reserves, for decades both policy makers and 
the public have recognized that economically and ecologically accessible supplies of 
fossil fuels are finite. Although debate persists over how long supplies will last, many 
experts perceive that reserves could be exhausted in the near future. In 1956, Shell Oil 
geologist M. King Hubbert, in a controversial paper,57 predicted that American domestic 
production of oil would peak in 1970, a forecast that turned out to be correct (Figure 3.4 
in Chapter 3 illustrates this point). Hubbert’s modeling techniques have been extended, 
with varying results, to the global oil supply. Many experts trying to predict peak global oil 
production have placed the high point between 2010 and 2020; some optimists, perhaps 
most notably Cambridge Energy Research Associates,58 place the peak beyond the 
year 2030.
Corollaries to peak oil can be found for coal and natural gas. Peak coal production in 
the United States is predicted to occur in the 2030s; however, peak coal energy output 
may already have occurred because of the depletion of higher-quality coal reserves. Peak 
natural gas is harder to estimate because of the lack of certainty over gas reserves and the 
recent upgrade of natural gas resources, described in Chapter 2.
Although these timelines differ, nearly everyone agrees that economically recoverable 
fossil fuel reserves are limited. Perceived and real oil supply shortages, combined with 
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rapidly growing oil demand in developing economies such as those in China and India, 
have contributed to extreme oil price fluctuations (plotted in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3). 
These fluctuations have, in turn, resulted in huge economic dislocations and uncertainty; 
they likely contributed to the US recession beginning in 2008.
environmental Impact
The third major consideration underpinning the modern energy challenge implicates 
fossil fuels in an array of threats to the environment. Most immediate is the threat to 
public health through degraded air, water, and soil. At its extreme, concern over the 
environmental impact of fossil fuels has brought into question the ability of the planet to 
sustain continued human activity.
The health impacts of environmental pollution have only recently been understood. 
They come from many sources. Some health impacts arise from manmade disasters such 
as oil spills or nuclear plant failures, as in Chernobyl in 1986, for example. In 1952 a “killer 
fog” in London attributed to the burning of dirty fuels killed more than 4,000 people.
Other sources of pollution are continuous rather than catastrophic. For example, motor 
vehicle emissions are thought to be among the primary causes of a rise in asthma cases, 
particularly among young children.59 Bronchitis, various upper respiratory infections, 
heart attacks, and other maladies are also associated with air pollution. Coal mining 
threatens water supplies, particularly if the coal is taken through strip mining, which can 
also leave barren soil prone to erosion. Together, one study estimated that air, water, and 
soil pollution account for 40 percent of worldwide deaths each year.60 More indirectly, 
cheap energy contributes to the increasingly sedentary lifestyle of many people in the 
industrialized world, giving rise to growing rates of obesity and related chronic health 
effects.
Pollution from the production and consumption of fossil fuels also poses economic 
risks, such as  managing the public health effects of pollution. The externalities of energy 
production and consumption create other widespread risks as well. Oil spills such as that 
from the Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010 threaten fisheries and other industries, 
including tourism. The cost of securing overseas sources of energy burdens the American 
economy, as does the price volatility that marks the international oil market.
Interactions between energy markets and other sectors of the economy are enormously 
complex. Moreover, developing accurate assessments of the relative life-cycle emissions 
of alternative energy production technologies is quite difficult and, therefore, frequently 
misrepresented or misunderstood. For example, biofuels are typically assumed to have 
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zero net emissions from combustion, but expanded use of biofuels in the transportation 
sector will likely require large quantities of agricultural and forest feedstocks, which 
require energy to produce. Producing an agricultural crop for use as a bioenergy feedstock 
requires energy for fertilizer production and pesticide production, transportation fuels for 
use in tractors and other equipment, and energy for transporting feedstocks to renewable 
energy facilities. All these activities result in CO2 emissions that at least partially offset 
the reduction in emissions associated with biofuels. In addition, fertilizer application and 
other agricultural activities contribute to emission of non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
Beyond these emissions, important effects on commodities and land markets occur as 
commodity prices change in response to demand for bioenergy feedstocks. One of the 
more difficult-to-assess elements of large-scale production of feedstocks for renewable 
energy is the net effect of expanded biofuels production on global land use. Of particular 
interest are the land types and quantity that might be converted to agricultural production 
in response to higher global commodity prices. For example, agricultural conversion of 
tropical forests, which store large quantities of carbon per acre, releases large quantities of 
CO2.
Perhaps most significantly, widespread—although by no means unanimous—
viewpoints warn that the consumption of fossil fuels is accelerating greenhouse warming 
of the Earth. Even if domestic reserves sufficed for US consumption and if global reserves 
lasted for several more centuries, the predictions of climate change theory suggest that the 
country will remain under considerable pressure to change its energy practices. Theories 
of human-generated climate change tend to piggyback on more widespread acceptance of 
the dangers of airborne pollutants and the even wider acceptance of environmentalism.
Environmental Movement
Three concepts—instability, scarcity, and environmental impact—form the basis for 
much of American knowledge of and opinion on contemporary energy issues. This broad 
social agreement has helped fuel the rise of one of the more successful post–World War II 
social movements in the United States: a broad-based environmental movement that has 
influenced energy policy debates and effected legislative and social successes across parties 
and ideologies.
The success of the environmental movement is ubiquitous. It is found, for example, 
in laws such as the various Clean Air Acts of 1955, 1963, 1967, 1970, 1977, and 1990 
and the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Other ramifications include the setting aside 
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of considerable amounts of conservation territory; changes in American consumer 
behavior, such as increased recycling; and the development of hybrid automobiles. The 
environmental movement has become so fundamentally a part of everyday modern 
American life that its genesis as an actual social—and political—movement is sometimes 
forgotten.
Despite the successes of the environmental movement, its actual impact on the energy 
choices of American society can be overstated. Fuel efficiency in cars, for example, has 
improved only slightly, as the demand for larger and more powerful automobiles has 
kept pace with technological improvements in fuel efficiency; from 1990 to 2006, average 
passenger car fuel efficiency in the United States increased from 20.3 miles per gallon to 
only 22.4 miles per gallon.61 Total US CO2 emissions in 2007 reached the highest levels 
ever, up 17 percent from 1990, and they are forecasted to continue to increase.62 The 
environmental movement, for all its success in recent decades, has had a limited impact 
on energy consumption. Moreover, its tenets remain in uneasy tension with America’s 
dominant free market ideology and with views about individual liberties.
Moving forward to meet the energy and environmental challenges outlined here will 
force choices on the American population. As consumers, Americans will have to choose 
between pursuing energy conservation (consuming less) and investing in energy efficiency 
(consuming differently). How we choose to mix these two ways of confronting energy 
shortages will prove critical in shaping American society in the twenty-first century. 
As citizens, we will be asked to weigh the different values we place on the environment 
and the economy as well as on individual choice and societal constraint. We will also 
debate the role of government in effecting the energy infrastructure transformation. 
Understanding the ways that American society will approach these choices is critical to 
understanding America’s energy future.
Divisions in Public Opinion
Measuring public opinion on energy options and the environmental impact of the 
public’s energy choices has interested researchers and policy makers for decades. Our 
understanding of societal attitudes, however, remains piecemeal. The lack of regular, 
large-scale, scientifically designed survey projects has left the literature on the public’s 
views somewhat incoherent. Nonetheless, a review of the scholarly and popular literature 
suggests some important conclusions.
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At least three widely recognized divisions exist in the American population with regard 
to general attitudes toward energy choices:
1. a marked generation gap, as young people have proven more sympathetic to energy 
conservation and the exploration of alternative sources than their parents or 
grandparents;
2. clear socioeconomic divisions, which affect how people consider energy policy and 
their own attitudes and behaviors; and
3. geographic divisions within the United States, both between different regions of the 
country and between rural and urban residents, with the western states having been 
at the center of disputes in recent decades.
the Generation Gap
The generation gap in attitudes toward energy and the environment is somewhat more 
complicated than it may at first appear. Generally, young people repeatedly express more 
concern about the environment than older people do, but they express less concern 
about several specific energy topics. This difference reflects the different consumer role 
that young people fill in industrial societies. For example, a Eurobarometer survey in 
2007 found that young people were less concerned than older people about the energy 
efficiency of appliances: more than one-third (36 percent) said they did not really care, 
compared with 14 percent to 17 percent of older cohorts.63 As people age and become 
more attuned to energy costs, their sensitivity to energy conservation often increases.
On energy itself, younger people tend to profess more “green” attitudes than their 
elders, although their definitions of green differ and change over time. For example, a 
Harris Poll on nuclear power in 2008 found that older Americans were more likely than 
younger Americans to support construction of new nuclear plants: more than 60 percent 
of people 63 years of age or older favored new plants compared with less than 40 percent 
of people ages 18 to 31.64
Socioeconomic Divisions
Attitudes on energy correlate, as one may expect, with income and education. Higher 
levels of income and education are associated with modestly higher support for energy 
conservation and alternative sources and support for governmental intervention to ensure 
environmental protection.65 Income clearly plays a role in the sensitivity of Americans to 
energy prices: working-class Americans feel more vulnerable to spikes in gas prices than 
wealthier Americans do.
 Societal Dimension of America’s Energy Challenge 57
Rural and urban residents have divergent attitudes and behaviors as well. A series 
of studies extending back to the 1980s has sought to compare rural residents with 
their counterparts in urban areas. Results have been mixed. Some studies have argued 
that environmental concern is higher in cities, whereas others have disputed this 
conclusion.66,67 A 2005 study in Spain found high levels of environmental concern but low 
levels of pro-environmental behavior among both rural and urban residents. Although the 
samples differed considerably, the results suggested that people in rural areas experience 
environmentalism differently than people in cities.68
Geographic Divisions
Regions of the United States experience the energy crisis in disparate ways. Western states 
dominate fossil fuel production, generally have lower population densities, and have 
some additional political power relative to densely populated states as a result of equal 
representation in the US Senate. People in the colder Northeast show a higher sensitivity 
to heating-fuel prices than do people in the South. Different political cultures in the 
various US regions view debates on energy through quite different ideological lenses.
Divisions in Public Action
Level of engagement
More generally, public opinion varies both in the amount of engagement with energy 
issues and in attitudes toward solutions. By extension, the extent of social action by 
individuals or organizations also differs. A 2009 Public Agenda cluster analysis of its 
survey data found that its respondents broke into four broad groups:69
1. The Disengaged (19 percent), who know little about the energy problem and are not 
worried about it.
2. The Climate Change Doubters (17 percent), who are equally or more knowledgeable 
about energy than other Americans but have doubts about global warming theories. 
They are conservative politically, favor expanded oil exploration and drilling, choose 
economic growth over environmental protection, and yet often still favor investments 
in alternative energy sources like solar and wind.
3. The Anxious (40 percent), who are worried about the energy future, particularly the 
prospects of higher prices.
4. The Greens (24 percent), who favor energy conservation measures, oppose 
environmentally questionable policy decisions such as offshore and Alaskan oil 
drilling, and are willing to pay more for renewable energy.
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The Public Agenda results suggest that Americans value the various components of 
the energy question differently. Some emphasize the long-term environmental impact, 
and others emphasize the immediate impact of energy costs on the household budget. 
As individuals or collectively, then, Americans will differ in the economic decisions they 
make or other steps they take to address energy problems.
Level of Knowledge
As the Public Agenda study suggests, the abundant statistical data on energy and the 
numerous studies of public attitudes obscure Americans’ lack of knowledge that might 
inform their energy choices. The survey found that 39 percent of Americans could not 
name a fossil fuel, and even more could not name a renewable energy source. These 
results may be a combination of the lack of public knowledge and the quality of the survey 
design, however. 
Almost one-third of respondents said that solar energy contributes to global warming. 
Again, this result may have derived from a poorly worded question: solar energy 
generation does contribute to global warming through the manufacturing process for 
solar panels. In addition, the question could be interpreted to mean the contribution of 
solar insulation to the greenhouse effect.
Finally, nearly two-thirds said that most of the United States’ imported oil comes 
from the Middle East, a severe overestimate. Such misinformation may play a role in 
Americans’ views about events well beyond our borders and contribute to support for 
military actions that have significant unintended consequences for present and future 
generations. 
Public’s Preferences for Energy Sources
Despite their gaps in knowledge, Americans view forms of energy in specific ways. 
Generally, they show enthusiasm for renewable forms of energy, such as solar and 
wind. They dislike the nation’s reliance on oil and coal and look less favorably on other 
depletable energy sources, but they look favorably on natural gas and have starkly mixed 
feelings toward nuclear power. 
renewable energy Sources
Sustainable energy is defined as any energy source that provides for current needs without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own. Renewable energy, 
while sustainable by definition, is in addition perceived to be inexhaustible. Nevertheless, 
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the magnitudes of all renewable sources are bounded by suitable climates, geographies, 
available space, and in some cases, water.
The world has seen a rapid growth in interest in renewable energy sources. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, these sources constitute a small but important amount of American energy 
capacity and are growing rapidly. In 2010, The New York Times reported that America’s 
wind power industry increased capacity by 39 percent in 2009 alone.70 Although such 
increases start from exceedingly small amounts of capacity, and sustainable energy 
production does not contribute to air pollution and CO2 emissions, even these sources can 
pose significant environmental challenges.
Solar Energy
The most familiar renewable energy source is solar. Public perceptions about solar energy 
are nearly the opposite of attitudes toward coal and oil: solar energy is widely perceived 
as perhaps the foremost “clean” source of energy. The deployment of solar energy is 
increasing rapidly, as both absolute and relative costs fall. In 2008, according to the 
Solar Energy Industries Association, a trade group, US solar energy capacity increased 
17 percent.71 This increase included solar electric production, solar water heating, and 
other uses, such as swimming pool heaters and space heaters and coolers.
By 2025, according to one estimate, solar power could supply as much as 10 percent of 
the nation’s energy needs.72 Survey after survey has found that solar is the most popular 
alternative energy source. A 2004 survey in California, for example, found that 87 percent 
of likely voters had a favorable opinion of solar energy production.73
Solar energy’s popularity as a source of clean energy has not translated (at least not 
yet) into an economically viable option for many of the consumers who view it so 
favorably. Although solar energy’s cost is declining fairly quickly, it remains expensive 
and dependent on tax breaks. If the externalities of carbon-containing fuels are not 
internalized, then solar will remain among the least cost-competitive alternative sources, 
although the economics are complex and solar production is highly site-dependent.
A Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study in 2009 found that average capacity-
weighted, pre-incentive installed costs (real 2009 dollars per installed watt) remained flat 
from 2008 to 2009 at $7.50/W.74 The cost to the consumer was actually higher in 2009 
because of falling state subsidies; in California, for example, the state rebate declines as 
more solar systems are installed.75
The environmental impact of solar energy deployment is also not as straightforward 
as it may first appear. The potential impact on potable water resources is well recognized, 
60  Chapter 4
particularly in wilderness parts of the American Southwest, where solar energy is most 
efficient. The large-scale deployment of solar panels in uninhabited areas may be less 
efficient than dispersed installations, for example, on the tops of buildings.
Less appreciated is the environmental cost of solar modules, both in their manufacture 
and in their eventual disposal. Manufacturing solar panels is an energy-intensive process 
that often relies on fossil fuels, although over the course of the life of the panel that cost is 
mitigated by the power that the panel produces. Making photovoltaic cells often requires 
using such harmful substances as cadmium and arsenic compounds, which present 
challenges for proper disposal.
Wind Energy
Like solar power, wind energy is a small but rapidly growing source that enjoys widely 
favorable ratings. Although harnessing wind energy for power has existed for millennia, 
deploying wind turbines to produce electricity has only recently become a viable 
alternative to fossil fuels: from 2005 to 2008, power capacity from wind doubled. The 
World Wind Energy Association estimated that in 2008 wind generators produced 
1.5 percent of the global consumption of electricity; for some individual countries wind 
now contributes significantly to fulfillment of electric power needs.76
Wind is also a popular alternative fuel for American consumers. Farhar found that 
wind trailed only solar power as the preferred energy source for consumers.77 Few 
consumers, however, live near promising wind-generation sites. Wind generation 
itself produces no greenhouse gases. Although the impact of wind installations on the 
landscape prompts some opposition, some people report that they find wind generators 
aesthetically pleasing.
Hydroelectric Power
In addition to wind and solar power, Americans are at least somewhat familiar with 
several other renewable sources of energy. The principal one is hydroelectric power, a 
traditional source of electrical generation.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, water continues to supply a significant portion of the 
United States’ electricity needs, and water is the world’s most common renewable energy 
source. About 17 percent of the world’s electrical supply comes from hydroelectricity. 
In the United States it accounts for almost 70 percent of the electricity generated from 
renewable sources and about 6 percent of total US electrical generation. 
The main problems associated with further development of hydroelectricity are the 
shortage of appropriate sites in many countries, the environmental consequences of dam 
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construction, and the economics of the enormous initial investment that hydroelectric 
projects require. Consequently, hydroelectric power has increased at a slower rate than 
other sources of electricity.
Worldwide, hydroelectric power generation was 73.6 percent higher in 2006 than in 
1980, compared with 114.0 percent higher for fossil fuels and 289.0 percent higher for 
nuclear energy. In the United States, growth has been virtually nonexistent; the country 
produced only 1.4 percent more hydroelectric power in 2006 than in 1980.78 Virtually no 
chance exists for the resumption of large-scale dam construction in the near future in the 
United States.
China, by contrast, has seen dramatic growth and is now the world’s largest producer of 
hydroelectric power. The world’s largest hydroelectric project is the Three Gorges Dam on 
the Yangtze River.
Hydroelectric power generation is a mature technology that has met its limit in many 
countries because of societies’ unwillingness to bear the environmental and capital costs of 
investment.
At the same time, hydroelectric power itself enjoys widespread popular support. 
Consumers prefer it as a source for their utilities, even over natural gas. Only about 
15 percent of respondents in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study in 
2007 wanted to reduce power from dams at all; almost 40 percent wanted to increase it.65 
Hydroelectric power was seen as markedly more damaging to the environment than wind 
or solar, although still much less damaging than fossil fuels.65,77 The wording of MIT’s 
questions about the popularity of hydroelectric power, however, likely makes isolating 
attitudes toward hydroelectric production from attitudes toward hydroelectric investment 
difficult.
The question of public knowledge and attitudes toward hydroelectric power, at least in 
the United States, may be largely moot because site and environmental factors constrain 
further development.
Biomass
Introduced in Chapter 2, biomass is a broad term that denotes the use of renewable 
biological material for the production of energy. The material could be forest or 
agricultural residue (e.g., stumps, barks, corn stalks, or husks) or plants grown specifically 
for use in energy generation.
Corn-based ethanol constitutes about 3 percent of the US automobile fuel supply, 
according to 2007 data. The United States allows up to 10 percent ethanol to be mixed into 
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gasoline, and some states and cities mandate this mixture. The United States is the largest 
producer of ethanol in the world; ethanol production has increased tenfold since 1990, 
largely because of its fuel use.
Whether corn-based ethanol offers a truly renewable source of energy is questionable 
given that it requires tilling, fertilizing, harvesting, processing, and distributing. Certainly 
it substitutes for significant quantities of imported oil. The use of corn-based ethanol as 
a fuel admixture depends on significant agricultural subsidies. In addition, it has been 
implicated in increasing food prices and competition for food-producing agricultural 
land. Cane sugar–based ethanol, as is produced in Brazil, is not perceived to interfere with 
the food supply. Worldwide, substantial research is under way to develop an economically 
viable process for producing ethanol through the decomposition of cellulosic agricultural 
residue. Such a technology would affect agricultural markets less than corn-based ethanol 
production does.
Public knowledge and opinion about biomass are difficult to determine, in part because 
the term is so broad and can be used in so many contexts. What is clear is that biomass, 
through its link to agriculture, is more closely interwoven with the lives of more people 
than extractive fossil fuels or large-scale wind or solar generation. Because of the variety 
of environmental impacts of biomass fuel production, however, the economic viability and 
environmental sustainability of biomass efforts will depend on careful management of this 
method of fuel production.
Geothermal Energy
Geothermal energy, although less familiar, is well regarded by the American public. Farhar 
found that 71 percent of utility customers were in favor of geothermal energy production. 
This figure was lower than those for solar, wind, or natural gas but was in the mid-range 
for all energy options.77
Depletable energy Sources
Of the traditional fossil sources of energy, oil and coal share the lowest public esteem—
natural gas is viewed more favorably. Oil and coal, particularly coal, are associated with 
pollution, and oil incurs the additional implication of foreign dependence. Coal, oil, and 
natural gas account for 85 percent of the world’s energy consumption. Each is a carbon-
based fuel source heavily (although not equally) implicated in global climate change, and 
each is thought to have finite reserves.
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Oil and Coal
Oil accounted for an estimated 37 percent of global energy consumption in 2008. It holds 
a prominent place in most Americans’ knowledge, perceptions, and opinions on energy,79 
perhaps in part because of American drivers’ sensitivity to oil prices. Unlike other energy 
consumption choices, gasoline reminds American consumers of price spikes whenever 
they fill up their tanks and see gas prices prominently advertised along streets and 
highways. Energy sources for electricity consumption remain hidden from view, but no 
one mistakes the source of fuel for their cars.
Coal, an even older energy source than oil, is the second-largest source of global energy, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. It is the leading source for generation of electricity. In 2006 coal 
supplied 129 quads of the global energy demand, compared with 169 quads from oil and 
107 quads from natural gas. The share of global energy for coal has declined slightly over 
the past 40 years, from 29.2 percent in 1970 to 27.4 percent in 2006.78 Despite this share 
decline, the world still consumes more than twice as much coal each year as it did in 1970.
Two factors drive public attitudes toward oil and coal: price and the environment. 
Consumers have a close association with oil economics; when prices are high, interest in 
alternative fuels and concern over foreign policy spike, only to recede again with lower 
prices of gasoline. The close relationship that many consumers have with oil economics 
complements a direct sensory impression of oil as an unclean energy source. Although 
consumers may not breathe tailpipe emissions directly, and although few people nowadays 
change their own motor oil, most people directly experience oil and oil products in a way 
that is not true of coal, natural gas, or other energy sources. Similarly, liquid oil spills from 
wrecked tanker ships or offshore oil rigs have left a vivid mental image of oil as a pollutant 
in a way that gaseous pollutants, for example, generally have not.
Coal-fired electrical plants release harmful heavy metals, such as lead, mercury, nickel, 
tin, cadmium, antimony, and arsenic, into the atmosphere. Coal emits an estimated 0.963 
kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated from it, compared with 0.881 
kilograms for oil and 0.569 kilograms for natural gas. For these reasons, most Americans 
perceive coal as a particularly “dirty” source of energy.
American consumers consistently rank coal among the least preferred sources of 
electricity. A 1999 review of utility market surveys found that coal ranked a distant last 
among both residential and commercial customers in their preferences for source of 
electricity.77 In addition, 69 percent of customers characterized themselves as somewhat 
or strongly opposed to coal, compared with 11 percent for natural gas; they ranked 
coal with nuclear power as the least preferred of sources.77 The poor image of coal has 
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prompted a reaction from the coal and power industries, which promote clean coal 
technologies. The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, for example, argues that 
advanced technologies make coal an economic and environmentally friendly choice for 
the near future.80
Despite the “dirty” reputation of coal, the MIT survey in 2007 found that far fewer 
Americans wanted to increase oil usage than wanted to increase usage of any other energy 
source, including coal (Table 4.1).65 Only 7.8 percent of respondents wanted to increase 
the use of oil, a decline from the results of the same survey conducted in 2002, when 12.7 
percent of respondents wanted to increase the use of oil. The difference between those 
wanting to increase oil and those wanting to increase coal (18.8 percent in 2007) may 
be attributable to Americans’ recognition of domestic coal reserves and of the greater 
likelihood that oil has been imported from abroad. It may also reflect the notion of coal as 
a cheap energy source.
Table 4.1. Distribution of preferences about energy sources, 2007 (percent)
Energy source Do not use Reduce Keep the same Increase
Coal 6.6% 47.7% 27.0% 18.8%
Hydroelectric 4.0% 10.9% 45.1% 39.9%
Natural gas 3.5% 26.5% 38.8% 31.3%
Nuclear power 11.3% 28.0% 25.0% 35.7%
Oil 6.4% 67.7% 18.1% 7.8%
Solar 2.7% 7.5% 13.1% 76.8%
Wind 3.8% 4.7% 14.2% 76.8%
Source: Adapted with permission from the MIT Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems.65
Coal avoids the price awareness and the foreign policy implications of oil, but it 
carries an even heavier burden of pollution. Of all the sources of energy, coal has perhaps 
the worst public image in this regard. Its production and consumption are marked by 
negative associations, from the coal mine to the power plant. Coal mining results in local 
environmental degradation, whether it is mined by stripping the earth’s surface or by 
tunneling beneath it. Mining coal produces huge amounts of waste, much of it toxic. Coal 
mining is associated in the public mind with terrible workplace conditions and with some 
of America’s worst historical labor conflicts. Transporting coal is expensive, often costing 
more than mining it, which decreases coal’s efficiency.
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Natural Gas
Like oil and coal, natural gas is a fossil fuel, but it has markedly better properties and 
public image. It is in many ways the obverse of coal: natural gas enjoys the widespread 
perception that it is a clean source of energy. This perception may be attributable in 
part to the successful marketing campaign of industry groups such as the American 
Gas Association, which touts it as “America’s responsible energy choice” and sponsors’ 
advertising natural gas as a clean alternative to petroleum. 
With more than half the homes in the United States being heated with natural gas, 
people have a familiarity with it that they lack with coal. Natural gas is also mostly 
delivered and consumed without the consumer’s ever seeing, smelling, or feeling it. 
Perhaps as a result, consumers rate natural gas nearly as high as solar and wind among 
their energy preferences.77
As discussed in Chapter 2, estimates of the probable US natural gas reserves were raised 
in 2009 by 39 percent. The new figure yields an estimated supply, at current consumption 
rates, that will last about 100 years. Consequently, natural gas seems increasingly 
likely to take significant additional market share from coal in electricity generation. 
Environmentalists have however raised concerns about the process of hydraulic fracturing, 
a highly effective method of natural gas extraction, as a potential source of contamination 
of the water supply. Undoubtedly this issue will continue to attract attention and may 
influence the society’s attitudes regarding  natural gas. 
Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy provides about 6 percent of global energy needs, although this amount 
varies greatly from country to country. In America, nuclear supplies 8.5 percent of our 
national energy consumption. 
Nuclear is perhaps the most controversial of energy sources, and public opinion in the 
United States on nuclear energy is more complicated than for any other source. Opinions 
about it vary widely, and views may shift in positive or negative ways more easily than for 
other sources. To some, it is the most dangerous energy source, the producer of extremely 
toxic waste, and one vulnerable to catastrophic or even apocalyptic failures. To others, it is 
a potential source of clean and domestic electrical power generation far into the future.
The previously quoted 2007 MIT survey studied consumers’ preferences about many 
alternative energy sources, from solar to hydroelectric.65 As shown in Table 4.1, nuclear 
power evoked the most divided response; more people (11 percent) advocated no future 
use of nuclear than advocated no future use of any other source. At the same time, almost 
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36 percent wanted to see use increase. Moreover, fairly equal numbers wanted to use 
nuclear power “a lot” and wanted to reduce it “a lot.”65
Overall, nuclear power was preferred as a future energy source over only oil. The 
percentage of respondents who considered nuclear generation “very harmful” was higher 
than the percentage for any other source, even coal, but again, opinion was sharply 
divided: 28 percent responded that nuclear was only slightly harmful or not at all.65 
The findings suggest that attitudes toward nuclear energy may be more malleable than 
opinions about other fuel sources.
Public’s Willingness to Pay
The public attitudes and opinions we have surveyed frame the energy decisions that 
Americans will make on many public policy fronts in coming decades. Support for 
increased governmental investments in renewable energy technology, for example, will 
depend on the willingness of American voters to support such expenditures in the face of 
enormous and growing federal budget deficits. The role of coal and oil in America’s energy 
portfolio will depend on the willingness of Americans to support mining and drilling 
operations that will become more complex and may change with respect to their impact 
on the environment as more readily accessible reserves are exhausted. Similarly, nuclear 
power will be very sensitive to the preferences of the American public.
As discussed in Chapter 3, decisions on energy use are often made through consumer 
choice, in which availability and price play major roles. Energy choices are not made in 
the abstract—Americans sort through options with the financial costs firmly in mind. 
Some experiments and surveys have examined the willingness of Americans to pay 
more for sustainable energy. For example, Ansolobehere performed an experiment as part 
of the MIT survey on alternative energy sources.65 Half of the sample formed a control 
group of 615 people who were given no further information. A quarter of the sample was 
assigned to one treatment group, and another quarter was assigned to a second treatment 
group. The treatment groups received information for seven energy source alternatives, 
from coal to solar power, about the supposed costs to a family of four; the difference 
between the treatment of the two groups was the stated cost of nuclear energy.65
The experimental results suggested that people misapprehend the costs of the 
various energy choices. The respondents tended to judge alternative sources such as 
hydroelectricity, solar, and wind as cheap and to think of fossil fuels as expensive, although 
the opposite is true. At the same time, they tended to estimate properly the relative costs 
of conventional fuels: they knew that coal is cheapest and oil is most expensive.
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When respondents received information about the true costs of energy, coal saw a 
marked increase in support; natural gas and oil a smaller increase; and alternative sources, 
such as solar and wind, a significant decrease. This experiment and others suggest that 
support for alternative energy sources stems not only from their association with zero 
emissions but also from a misapprehension of their costs.
Similarly, Farhar investigated utility customers’ stated willingness to pay more for 
electricity that is renewable.77 Half of respondents indicated that they were “somewhat 
likely” or “very likely” to voluntarily pay more, whereas slightly less than half indicated 
an unwillingness to pay more. Farhar also cited “deliberative polling” studies, in which 
customers completed questionnaires before and after a weekend spent listening to 
presentations on energy and participating in discussions. The information caused only 
modest increases in the willingness of customers to pay more for renewable energy 
sources, but his results did indicate an increased willingness to pay small additional 
amounts.77
Energy Conservation
Study of the behavioral dimensions of energy consumption has focused on conservation, 
the willingness of people and organizations to use less energy in their daily lives, either 
on their own initiative or in response to stimuli such as government-financed tax 
breaks. Businesses and individuals may also practice energy conservation as a means of 
maximizing profit and economic security. Boosting energy conservation remains a central 
part of US energy and climate policy.
Conservation has had some notable successes. Recycling programs, which lower energy 
consumption through the avoidance of some production processes, are nearly ubiquitous. 
Widespread consumer education has promoted water conservation, fuel-efficient cars, and 
better-built homes that reduce the energy costs of cooling and heating.
Significant barriers prevent more widespread energy conservation. Consumers may 
find that the costs of researching and obtaining more efficient technologies outweigh 
realized energy savings. Various efforts at “eco-labeling,” like the US Department of 
Energy’s Energy Star program, seek to boost consumer knowledge of energy-efficient 
alternatives and the savings they may produce.
More problematically, technological improvements can increase energy consumption 
while increasing energy efficiency, a paradox formulated by an English economist William 
Stanley Jevons in 1866.81 Jevons observed that improvements in fuel efficiency in coal-
burning plants led to increases in the amount of coal consumed, largely because of the 
68  Chapter 4
wider adoption of the new technologies. Proponents of energy conservation use Jevons’ 
Paradox to assert the need for “green energy” taxes, which would keep the costs the same 
and recover the resulting savings for reinvestment, presumably in clean energy sources.
Enabling consumers to increase their conservation lies at the heart of efforts to implement 
the smart electric grid, as described in Chapter 2, to augment the traditional one-way 
delivery of electrical power. Overlaying the current electric grid with digital feedback 
devices, including net metering, would allow for conservation measures, such as 
automatically running some appliances at off-peak times and turning off some uses at 
peak times. These automated adjustments would decrease reliance on expensive auxiliary 
power plants.
Energy Politics and Geopolitics
America’s energy challenge is global. This fact has long been recognized in terms of the 
country’s reliance on oil. Other forms of energy, both traditional and emerging, also have 
distinct political geographies, both domestically and globally. In this section we consider 
the linkage between public opinion and the US foreign and domestic policies.
US Foreign politics
Oil
More than attitudes toward any other source of energy, attitudes toward oil are 
intertwined with complex questions of foreign policy, environmentalism, and big business. 
Multinational oil companies such as Shell and Exxon-Mobil have a brand awareness that 
nuclear, natural gas, or even coal companies do not match.
In addition, the price sensitivity of oil at the gasoline pump creates linkages in 
Americans’ minds between world events and consumer pocketbooks. When, for instance, 
war breaks out in the Middle East, Americans are acutely aware of its impact on their 
commuting costs. Unlike the situation for electricity generation, where coal, natural gas, 
or nuclear power can be substituted as prime sources, little can currently be done for 
transportation to substitute for the primary fuel source, oil. Various fuels are available to 
heat a house, for example; at least until electrical vehicles become feasible, however, nearly 
everyone who drives will use gasoline.
The role of oil in complicating and, in some cases, driving American foreign policy is 
widely recognized. The United States imports more than half of its oil, making it heavily 
dependent on particular countries and regions to secure its supply. As shown in Table 4.2, 
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six countries account for about two-
thirds of all oil imports. Approximately 
half of America’s oil imports come from 
countries belonging to OPEC. Member 
countries of OPEC are Algeria, Angola, 
Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
The fact that the United States 
imports oil from a much wider 
assortment of countries than the 
Arab nations of the Middle East is not 
widely recognized. Nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that most of the country’s 
imported oil comes from the Middle East. In reality, only 10 percent of the US domestic 
consumption comes from the Persian Gulf (primarily from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as 
shown in Table 4.2). About 29 percent of US domestic consumption comes from all the 
OPEC countries combined.
A similar lack of information fosters American attitudes toward the development of 
domestic reserves. For example, Americans tend to grossly overestimate the impact on 
self-sufficiency of measures such as offshore oil drilling or expanding oil production in 
Alaska. Alaska currently provides approximately 3 percent of US energy consumption.
Coal
Foreign policy with regard to coal is influenced by domestic policy. The domestic political 
geography of coal resembles that of oil. A few states dominate production (Table 4.3), 
although about 25 states produce at least some coal. This dominance leads to coal’s 
importance to these states’ elected officials and to considerably less importance to officials 
Table 4.2. Major oil exporters to the United States, 
2008
Exporting country
Percentage of US oil 
imports
Canada 19.3%
Saudi Arabia (OPEC Member) 11.8%
Mexico 10.1%
Venezuela (OPEC Member) 9.2%
Nigeria (OPEC Member) 7.7%
Iraq (OPEC Member) 4.9%
Source: Adapted with permission from the US Energy Information 
Administration.82
Table 4.3. Major coal-producing states, 2008
State Short tons (millions)a Percentage of US total
Wyoming 467.6 39.9%
West Virginia 158.0 13.5%
Kentucky 119.9 10.3%
Pennsylvania 65.3 5.6%
a  Short ton is a unit of weight equal to 2,000 pounds (0.907 metric ton or 907.18 kilograms).
Source: Adapted with permission from the US Energy Information Administration.82
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of other states; this disparity results in coal interests’ predictably intense lobbying efforts at 
both state and federal levels, as well as the accompanying impact on campaign finances.
Geopolitically, America’s relative self-sufficiency with regard to coal puts it in a 
situation that differs greatly from that for oil. Rising demand overseas through the 
2000s pushed American coal exports to record levels. From 2007 to 2008 alone, exports 
increased 37.8 percent, a sign of the volatility of the international coal market. In 2008 
the United States exported 81.5 million short tons while importing 34.2 tons, mostly from 
Colombia. As domestic coal production has shifted westward and as transportation costs 
and demand for low-sulfur coal have risen, importing low-sulfur coal by ship to power 
plants on the East Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico has become more cost competitive.
Natural Gas
Fifteen countries produce 84 percent of the world’s supply of natural gas. Russia and the 
United States are the leading producers, each with about one-fifth of the global annual 
amount. US natural gas production remained flat between 1975 and 2005 but has been 
rising since, approaching its early-1970s peak.
The United States has proven reserves of 238 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough 
to last about 10 years if the country were completely reliant on domestic supplies. Recent 
estimates of future recoverable gas reserves, however, suggest much higher amounts (as 
mentioned earlier, recently revised estimates of probable US reserves are about 100 years 
at current rates of consumption). Russia’s proven natural gas reserves are close to 7 times 
greater than those of the United States; Iran and Qatar also have vast reserves of the fuel.79
Transporting natural gas through pipelines has led to somewhat different geopolitics 
than the tanker route geopolitics of oil. Russia has engaged in disputes with Belarus and 
Ukraine over natural gas prices, creating worries that Europe’s access to supplies may 
become endangered. Pipelines figure prominently in the geopolitics of Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, in particular.
Because of the transportation difficulties inherent in natural gas supply, pipelines and 
terminals are sometimes perceived as homeland security vulnerabilities. In 2007 al-Qaeda 
called for militants to attack oil and natural gas supplies, and some evidence suggests 
plots by the group to target liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. A 2007 report from the 
US Government Accountability Office focused on studies of the vulnerability of domestic 
LNG facilities and the impact of a terrorist attack on the surrounding population.83 
The report concluded that the government must continue to strive for maximum safety 
measures for LNG facilities. These include positioning the facilities far away from densely 
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populated areas to minimize the appeal of the target and the consequences of any mishap, 
accident, or sabotage.
Nuclear Energy
The United States generated 806 billion kWh of electricity from nuclear power plants in 
2007, about one-fourth of the world’s total. Other leading producers of nuclear power 
were
•	 France,	418	billion	kWh;
•	 Japan,	251	billion	kWh;
•	 Russia,	148	billion	kWh;
•	 South	Korea,	136	billion	kWh;	and
•	 Germany,	136	billion	kWh.
By comparison, the two most populous countries, China and India, had a combined 
production of only 79 billion kWh. Nuclear generation provides approximately 18 percent 
of the United States’ electrical needs, in contrast with 27 percent of Europe’s.79 France, 
Belgium, and Slovakia obtain more than half their electrical supply from nuclear power.
Nuclear reactors represent some of the most sophisticated technology known to 
humanity. Splitting the atom was a milestone of scientific achievement, and modern 
nuclear reactors draw from a combination of advanced physics, chemistry, engineering, 
construction, and systems design. Even the limited deployment of nuclear power in the 
United States represents many billions of dollars of combined investment in research, 
construction, and operation.
Technological achievement and coordination required for the implementation of 
nuclear power are significant challenges, but those have not been the chief reasons that 
development of nuclear power as a source of electricity generation in the United States 
floundered. Instead, nuclear power development has been stymied by complex societal 
and socioeconomic processes. Concerns about nuclear production’s impact on the earth’s 
environment, its long-term safety, and its possible proliferation, while simultaneously 
increasing the cost of any new nuclear installation, guide the course of American nuclear 
policy development.
From essentially the same technological base, the United States and France have 
pursued remarkably different paths for their nuclear industries. The same can be said, to 
greater or lesser degrees, for the other forms of energy we have discussed. Even for still 
immature technologies, such as solar or wind energy, their success or failure will have as 
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much to do with the societal contexts in which they are deployed  as with humans’ ability 
to maximize efficiency through better engineering.
Nuclear facilities remain a concern for homeland security because of the catastrophic 
damage that sabotage or attack could cause. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, heightened fears that hijacked aircrafts could be flown into the cooling towers or 
containment areas of nuclear plants and release radiation, although industry trade groups 
dispute the likelihood that an airplane could penetrate the containment structure. Fears 
of proliferation and delivery of nuclear weapons material to nonstate entities—for the 
purpose of fabricating a “dirty bomb,” for example—indirectly foster the perception that 
nuclear energy is implicated in global terrorism.
State-sponsored nuclear power, with its potential to provide weapons-grade material, 
is a unique foreign policy dilemma. The United States has sought to contain nuclear 
proliferation while encouraging nuclear power for peaceful uses—not always successfully. 
Recent crises with Iran and North Korea are prominent signs of the general struggle to 
contain nuclear power globally.
Nuclear power, long viewed with suspicion because of its potential for environmental 
destruction, is receiving another look because of rising concern about global climate 
change and increasingly uncertain supplies of fossil fuels. Some environmentalists are 
looking more favorably on nuclear power. Likewise, public opinion may change if energy 
prices rise or if, for example, electrical vehicles replace gasoline-powered cars on the 
nation’s highways, which would increase demand for electricity.
Wind and Solar Energy
The politics of wind and solar power, unlike the politics of more traditional forms of 
energy, tend to be local (to the United States and, more specifically, to states, regions, and 
communities). With no intercontinental transport of the electricity, wind and solar power 
sources incur the problems of “not in my backyard” attitudes and the conflicting activities, 
policies, and politics that accompany such feelings. Even advocates of clean energy join 
protests over installation locations that are too close to either their own homes or fragile 
natural environments.
Increasingly, the environmental impact of wind generation’s bulky spinning turbines 
has aroused local opposition. Birds and some mammals, particularly bats, may be at risk 
from wind generators. In fact, in December 2009 a federal judge halted expansion of a 
West Virginia wind farm because of its potential impact on endangered Indiana bats.84 
Aesthetic and other concerns, as was the case with the Cape Cod wind farm mentioned 
 Societal Dimension of America’s Energy Challenge 73
previously, can also arouse local opposition. No other source of energy evinces such 
disparity between its broad general support and its local opposition.
Although large-scale wind developments dominate much of Americans’ thinking about 
wind energy, small-scale generation, of less than 50 kW capacity, has long been part of 
the electrical system. It particularly affects people off the grid, those in isolated places, 
and people endeavoring to minimize their carbon footprint. Widespread adoption of a 
smart electric grid, described in Chapter 2, may make the installation of domestic wind 
generators on rooftops in some areas more attractive.
Internationally, the political geography of wind energy, like that of other sources, is 
highly variable. Supported by large governmental subsidies, wind is now responsible for
•	 19	percent	of	stationary	electrical	generation	in	Denmark,
•	 13	percent	in	Spain	and	Portugal,
•	 7	percent	in	Germany	and	Ireland,
•	 1.5	percent	in	the	United	States,	and
•	 less	than	1	percent	in	China.
The production of wind turbines is centered in the United States and China. China is 
investing substantially in manufacturing and innovation.
Solar power is not immune to geopolitics. China’s massive investment in solar 
development and production has sparked US fears that the United States will lose clean 
energy jobs and technological leadership. Like other sources of energy, solar power 
is unevenly distributed over the earth’s surface and even across the territory of large 
countries such as the United States. Climate and topography limit its utility in some 
places.
US Domestic politics
Divisions like those delineated above have produced the expected partisan political 
divisions. Splits along political or ideological lines have an important impact on how 
the United States frames responses to its energy and climate challenges. Intensified 
partisanship over energy policy has entered the public consciousness, as evidenced by 
chants of “drill, baby, drill” at Republican rallies, when offshore drilling became an issue 
in the 2008 presidential election. Subsequently, the issue of offshore drilling has been 
immensely complicated by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster.
Republicans have tended to be more skeptical of claims of human-induced global 
warming and the more aggressive remedies that have been proposed, although Republican 
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attitudes toward climate change vary considerably. The environmental movement has 
tended to support Democratic candidates more often than Republican ones, but the 
Republican Party does have a strong conservation tradition dating back at least to 
President Theodore Roosevelt in the early twentieth century.
On energy policy, Democrats have tended to support the government’s investment in 
alternative energy technologies, in part because of skepticism that market forces alone 
will produce timely viable options. Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, however, 
a consensus appeared to emerge that federal leadership in energy policy was needed. 
This consensus significantly departed from the state of affairs in the 1980s, when Ronald 
Reagan ran for office on a vow to disband the US Department of Energy.
The role of energy in determining voters’ choices is inadequately understood. A 
growing body of literature addresses “green politics,” and anecdotal information suggests 
that energy policy plays an important role in political campaigns. Nevertheless, we lack 
in-depth studies of the degree to which energy challenges influence Americans’ choices at 
the ballot box.
Energy and Social Justice
Energy consumption and conservation enter into concerns about equity and social justice, 
particularly globally. They also enter into disagreements over equitable solutions to global 
climate change. These concerns and controversies have helped scuttle some ambitious 
attempts at a coordinated response.
The major disagreement is over the distribution of burden for environmental and 
conservation measures, such as reduction of CO2 emissions, across rich and poor 
countries. Developing countries contend that countries such as the United States, which 
consumes disproportionate amounts of energy per capita, should assume a higher share 
of the costs. They also contend that countries such as the United States should not hold 
developing countries to emission control targets that may impair their ability to develop 
economically and reduce poverty.
Western countries, meanwhile, have argued that nothing can be done about climate 
change if increases in gas emissions in the developing world overtake reductions in 
industrialized countries. This kind of dispute has stymied some attempts to reach an 
international agreement, including efforts made at the 2009 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference (commonly known as the Copenhagen Summit).
Domestically, social justice concerns often emerge in arguments opposing increases in 
the costs of energy, particularly gasoline, through additional taxation. Gasoline taxes are 
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often characterized as regressive because they consume a higher proportion of the income 
of the poor than of the wealthy. Tensions also arise when, for example, home heating costs 
rise, disproportionately affecting the poor and those on fixed incomes, such as retirees. 
Finally, environmental justice advocates target the fact that many of the externalities 
of energy production and consumption, such as pollution and health problems, 
disproportionately burden poor and marginalized populations, such as racial and ethnic 
minority groups.
Prospects of Energy Success and Energy Failure
Future energy Options
We probably cannot identify with much precision in 2011 the energy choices that will 
be available in 2050, 2100, or beyond. Particularly if the cost of energy rises, a host of 
other avenues may be feasible for developing practical alternative fuels. The willingness of 
Americans to support and adopt these emerging technologies may play a critical role in 
addressing energy needs in the United States.
Some of these potential sources of energy are almost mundane, such as the kinetic 
energy produced by human beings as they go through everyday motions. For example, 
the Shibuya Central Station in Tokyo installed mats beneath its turnstiles to capture the 
energy of people walking into the train station. The power produced suffices to light the 
station’s light-emitting diode (LED) display boards and lights in the station’s interior 
walls.85
One promising emerging power source is the fuel cell, which produces electricity from 
the chemical reaction of a fuel (e.g., hydrogen) with an oxidant (air). The concept of fuel 
cells originated in the nineteenth century. Their first uses were with the American space 
program in the mid-twentieth century. More recently, hydrogen-powered fuel cells have 
been successfully demonstrated with vehicle fleets, including automobiles and city buses.
California has aggressively pushed fuel-cell technology, operating a series of hydrogen 
fueling stations and working with auto manufacturers (Honda, General Motors) to 
put several hundred fuel-cell demonstration cars on its highways. In the summer of 
2009, however, the Obama Administration canceled Department of Energy funding 
for developing hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles, citing the low likelihood that such vehicles 
would be practical in the next 10 to 20 years. The Administration also referred to the 
challenges of developing a national hydrogen fuel system. Nonetheless, fuel-cell research 
will continue. Whether fuel cells can be applied more widely or will remain a niche energy 
source remains to be seen.
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Another alternative energy source, ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC), has 
received attention. It uses the temperature differential between deep and shallow waters 
to operate a heat engine. The first OTEC plant, built in Cuba in 1930, generated 22 kW of 
electricity. In 1974 Hawaii developed the Natural Energy Laboratory, one of the world’s 
leading OTEC research facilities. To date, however, the large capital investments required 
for OTEC plants have prevented them from being cost-effective energy sources.
Tidal energy is another idea that has been around for hundreds of years. Tidal mills 
were in use in the Middle Ages and may date back as far as the Roman Empire. Despite 
this history, however, tidal energy is not in wide use in the world today, and its future 
remains uncertain.
The quest for new sources of energy, as distinguished from exploitation of current 
sources, will be undertaken, at least for the near future, in the middle of a fiscal crisis 
in Western industrialized democracies. Even in the best of circumstances, however, 
the ability of capitalist democracies to make public investments in long-term energy 
development remains open to debate.
With the pressing budget demands of the modern welfare state, investments in 
energy research may be curtailed. Planned or hybrid economies such as China may 
find themselves better positioned to make the necessary large capital investments in 
emerging energy technologies. China has demonstrated this possibility with its extensive 
investments in wind and solar power in recent years. Lacking the transparency of 
democracies, such countries may also make major missteps.
the prospect of Failure
The search for solutions to America’s energy challenges should be accompanied by a 
search for ways to prepare the country if these challenges cannot be fully addressed. These 
failures can be classified in various ways:
•	 Failures	could	be	in	the	short	term,	as	with	the	California	electrical	blackouts	of	2000	
and 2001 and the periodic shortages of gasoline due to embargoes or threats to the 
supply chain. These shortages disrupt local and national economies and represent a 
homeland security vulnerability.
•	 Failures	could	be	in	the	medium	term,	as	with	the	depletion	of	economically	
recoverable fossil fuel reserves before adequate development of alternative energy 
sources. These transitional shortages could cause instability on a global scale, because 
they would almost certainly occur unevenly across different countries.
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•	 Failures	could	be	in	the	long	term,	if,	for	example,	human	societies	must	adapt	to	
chronic energy shortages arising from increasing consumption, effects of climate 
change, and the failure to develop adequate sustainable energy sources. 
One promising route for this research would draw from the burgeoning homeland 
security literature and examine the impact of energy crises through the lens of community 
resiliency. Community resiliency is defined as the ability of communities to prepare for 
and respond to natural and manmade emergencies, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or 
terrorist attacks. This approach remains sensitive to two notions: first, that disasters do not 
affect all parts of society equally and, second, that preparedness is critical to mitigating the 
effects of traumatic events.
Modeling the impact of changing energy supplies on society is a complex undertaking, 
and the complexity increases as the time horizon moves away from the current situation. 
The United States may have the capital required to survive dramatic changes in its energy 
infrastructure, but other parts of the world appear more vulnerable.
For example, the post–World War II period has seen a dramatic increase in the 
productivity of agriculture—the so-called green revolution—which has seen yields rise 
significantly for a number of crops. This rise derives not only from genetic improvements 
in plants but from a heavy dependence on fertilizers, which are derived largely from fossil 
fuels. In developed countries, the mechanization of agriculture is similarly based on cheap 
energy. Critical questions involve the world’s ability to feed itself if energy shortages occur, 
and the impact of these shortages on the international political order.
Domestically, energy shortage will almost assuredly affect different social and 
geographic parts of the country differently, on both the consumption and production 
sides of exchange. American states with large energy sectors, such as Wyoming, Alaska, 
and Oklahoma, will feel the changes in their state economies. Cold-climate states will 
experience changes in their vulnerability to price hikes on heating fuels. Working-class 
people and the poor will be more vulnerable to abrupt shifts in energy than the wealthy, 
and retirees will experience energy shortage differently from the young. Improving 
our ability to predict the geography and sociology of energy shortage will be critical to 
ameliorating its effects.
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When the Belgian Camille Jenatzy raced down a kilometer track near Paris in 1899 to 
become the first person to break the 100-kilometer-per-hour speed barrier, no one was 
surprised that he did so in an electric car. Lacking gear shifters and hand cranks, electric 
cars were easier to start and drive than their gasoline-powered rivals; moreover, they 
were quieter and less smelly. By the turn of the century, a fleet of electric taxis conveyed 
passengers around New York and other cities. Electric cars, despite their slower speeds 
and limited range, outnumbered gasoline cars across the country by almost 2 to 1. Near 
the peak popularity of electric cars in 1911, The New York Times called them “ideal” 
because of their economy and cleanliness.
Electric cars were soon eclipsed by cars with internal combustion engines. Gasoline-
powered cars were cheaper, were easier and faster to refuel, had longer ranges, and were 
soon to have electric starters. By the 1930s, they had established the dominance they 
enjoy to this day. The demise of the electric car and its modern prospects for a return 
offer a window onto the kind of cross-cutting research we advocate in this monograph. As 
emphasized at the outset and particularly in Chapter 4, the research gaps fall largely into 
the societal dimension of our three-part conceptual framework. Both energy technologies 
and (somewhat less expansively) energy economics have been explored in detail in past 
decades, but social attitudes and perceptions, knowledge, behaviors, and considerations 
of social constructs such as justice and ethics have had far less attention. We aim here to 
foster a change by delineating the questions that warrant investigation and the means by 
which such studies should go forward.
The example of automobiles illustrates some of the information gaps, but the general 
issues extend to the many ways we use energy in this country beyond transportation. The 
technological advances in gasoline-powered cars, and the corresponding problems in 
overcoming the limits of turn-of-the-century electric power, necessarily conditioned the 
prevalence of the internal combustion engine. Similarly necessary to our understanding 
is the economics of the two types of cars: Henry Ford’s mass-production techniques cut 
the price of gasoline-fueled cars at the same time that the manufacturing costs of electric 
cars were rising. Improved technology and the economics of production and consumption 
favored the purchase of cars powered by gasoline.
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Nevertheless, Ford’s decision to mass-produce gasoline and not electric cars was 
characterized as a close call. The early demise of electric cars followed primarily from 
the lack of availability of suitable battery technology; however, neither technology nor 
economics alone can explain why electric cars disappeared for almost a century and 
personal transportation became dominated by gasoline-powered cars. An understanding 
of the social contexts in which the two technologies were deployed is critical.
The United States was slow to electrify. It would be the 1930s before the country 
undertook serious rural electrification. Electricity for cars lacked standardization, with 
voltages varying widely. Being basically a waste product in the manufacture of kerosene 
for lamps, gasoline at the time was cheap. In addition, gasoline was easy to transport and 
to store; any general store could keep drums of gasoline for passing motorists.
Distribution of electricity, by contrast, would have to wait for immense governmental 
investment in infrastructure. Gasoline-powered cars may have been smellier, but 
consumers considered them almost pristine compared with the horses they were 
replacing. Moreover, the quickly rising popular fascination with long-distance road 
trips corresponded with the strengths of gasoline-powered automobiles. By contrast, 
the heavier electric cars often found the poor roads of the time impassable and had 
insufficient range for cross-country travel.
No less important, politics and public policy drove the rise of gasoline-powered 
cars and the concurrent environmental, foreign policy, and other externalities we have 
described in this monograph. The sweeping changes wrought by the car culture—the 
impact not only on the American landscape and the American economy, but also on the 
American environment—arose because of a combination of technology, economics, and 
social preferences and choices. All three dimensions play out in personal behaviors and 
public policy.
With vast improvements in technology, electric cars are emerging again. Since they 
are not yet economical, nor do they outperform their gasoline-powered equivalents, 
their initial market penetration is driven by social forces that value their low emissions, 
independence from imported oil, and high-tech features attractive to early adopters.
Need for Multidisciplinary Energy Research
Although not complete, our understanding of the technical and economic dimensions 
of energy production and consumption is fairly well advanced. Energy elements such 
as production and consumption rates and energy reserves and capacity are tracked 
with copious data and supported by significant investments of research funding. Even 
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if projecting these into the future with precision remains difficult, we have sufficient 
knowledge to make at least reasonable estimates. For example, debate continues over 
exactly how much fossil fuel the earth contains and over humanity’s ability to exploit 
it without damaging the earth’s ability to sustain life, but we have largely in place the 
institutions and resources required to refine our estimates and increase the marginal 
efficiency of fossil fuel consumption.
Applying this technical and economic understanding to the United States’ energy 
challenges, however, has yielded incomplete knowledge and solutions. The challenge in 
moving from the technical and economic emphasis to the social is considerable. However 
complex hard science and economics may be, the complexities of the social contexts in 
which the technologies and economies will be chosen and used exceed them.
Individual and community behavior and attitudes will frame and, in many cases, limit 
the nation’s future energy options. Americans will have to make difficult choices among 
often competing concerns, such as environmental and ecological impacts, monetary 
costs, convenience, security of supply, sustainability, and social benefits. The outcomes 
will depend on the decisions and preferences of individuals as transmitted through their 
governments. Even the further development of energy technologies will depend on social 
context, in the form of public support for investments in basic and applied research and 
development. Knowledge about the hard science of energy outpaces our understanding of 
its social science contexts.
Potential Research Topics
Closing the gap between our hard science expertise and our understanding of social 
contexts will require contributions from several disciplines working with new sources 
of data and new methods. It will also require the synthesis of this new research and its 
integration with the technical and economic domains of energy research. In the work 
reflected in this monograph, we have reached some conclusions about research directions 
and topics, and we describe some possible research avenues. The following research areas 
and, in some cases, specific projects that we pose below illustrate some of the ways that 
America can move toward addressing its historic neglect of the social dimensions of 
energy.
addressing the Inadequacy of public Knowledge
What may be called “energy literacy,” the public’s everyday level of knowledge about 
energy options, is insufficient to support the informed choices that voters will be called 
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on to make in the coming decades. A better understanding of how much Americans 
actually know and understand about energy uses, sources, and options will help identify 
which policy areas require better explanation to the public. Such information will enable 
educational programs or communication schemes to target their efforts more efficiently.
Researchers and policy makers also need a better understanding of how public opinion 
on energy is shaped. Economics is a major determinant, but it may not be the dominant 
one. Other questions need to be addressed: What other forces influence how people think 
about various energy options? What arguments are most persuasive? How do secular 
events like recessions, energy shortages, natural disasters, or international events influence 
energy opinion? How quickly or slowly do these impacts take hold, or recede, over time? 
Research into how public opinion is shaped will yield a better understanding of the forces 
that create the social contexts in which energy options are considered.; it will allow as well 
for better tailoring of public information campaigns.
To this end, we conclude that the United States should consider instituting an annual 
or biannual survey of public opinion on energy and knowledge of energy options. This 
objective could be accomplished either in conjunction with the Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey now conducted by the US Energy Information Administration or as 
a separate effort. It would institutionalize and standardize the issues addressed by various 
periodic private surveys, providing a neutral, unaligned source of public opinion data, 
complementing the surveys funded by advocacy or industry groups. 
assessing the acceptance of alternative energy Deployments and 
their Impact on Society
The rapid growth of alternative energy sources such as wind and solar electricity 
generation offers opportunities for studying the societal acceptance and environmental 
impact of the large-scale deployment of solar and wind technologies. How seriously will 
Such a National Energy Opinion Survey could be guided by the following objectives:
•	 Develop	an	understanding	of	how	much	Americans	know	about	energy	sources,	technologies,	
alternatives, and their use. 
•	 Identify	effective	ways	to	increase	that	knowledge	where	gaps	exist.
•	 Monitor	shifts	in	public	opinion	to	clarify	the	immediate	and	longer-term	challenges	involved	in	
developing public support for energy initiatives.
•	 Determine	how	energy	economics	and	secular	events	shape	public	opinion,	and	estimate	the	rate	
at which such effects recede over time.
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the phenomenon of “not in my backyard” restrict the available prime locations for both 
forms of sustainable electrical generation? How will their development affect the political 
geography of energy and climate change? 
Infrastructure development of alternative energy sources has progressed far enough 
that both intensive and extensive studies of the impact of wind and solar installations are 
feasible. Conducting such work will yield information that will allow for better planning 
of future deployments. Local conflicts over the siting of renewable energy plants such as 
solar panels and wind turbines will almost certainly increase as these forms of energy are 
more widely deployed in coming decades. A better understanding of these conflicts and 
the government’s potential role in mediating them will ease the deployment of energy 
facilities while helping protect the rights of local residents.
Significant energy-efficient residential construction and construction materials 
technologies have evolved in countries with historically high energy prices—typically in 
Europe and in Japan. Whether the American society will be receptive to the introduction 
of these foreign alternative construction technologies remains unclear. Tracking adoption 
of such materials and technologies and clarifying the reasons for such technology 
diffusion (or lack of it) are important areas of future research.
The smart electric grid is a disruptive technology that will affect decisions about 
energy generation, distribution, and consumption by industrial, commercial, and 
residential consumers. The ultimate goal of the smart grid is to distribute electrical 
energy to consumers in a more efficient manner than is available today. Efficient energy 
distribution requires that utilities, governments, and organizations with an interest in 
energy conservation more fully understand consumer preferences, values, and decision 
making. Only then can they tailor communications programs, construction efforts, and 
the like most effectively.
The transportation segment will undoubtedly see further technology development. 
These technologies range from advanced materials (lighter, stronger) to hybrid, plug-
in hybrid, all-electric, and fuel-cell vehicles. The rate of conversion to such alternative 
technologies in transportation (or other energy uses) will be modulated by societal 
adaptation and acceptance. Future research can explore whether American society will 
adopt some, all, or none of these new technologies, and why. Adoption will clearly be 
determined by a combination of technological, economic, and societal forces; our focus 
here is on the social factors that are likely to play the biggest role in individual and 
organizational decision making. 
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To aid the adoption of these new technologies, we need to have a better understanding 
of the externalities associated with the production and consumption of fuels. Because 
of concerns about petroleum’s price stability, long-term availability, and negative 
externalities, considerable interest has been directed toward alternatives to petroleum 
transportation fuels. The externalities are associated with the effects of petroleum 
extraction, processing, and use on the environment and public health. Issues pertaining 
to the security of the petroleum supply complicate the picture. A fuller understanding 
of the externalities is essential in harnessing societal forces to support and implement 
an appropriate mix of alternative fuels that reflects the full impacts associated with 
production and consumption of each fuel.
The need to assess the societal acceptance and impact of alternative energy 
deployments opens the door to numerous research opportunities. Some of the examples 
that follow are focused on energy broadly defined; other are targeted to specific energy 
topics such as transportation, but the underlying questions can be generalized to a wide 
array of issues in this sector. 
Among the high-priority efforts, we recommend the following research:
•	 Determine	the	underlying	basis	for	conflicts	emanating	from	the	siting	of	renewable	energy	
plants and the government’s potential role in mediating them.
•	 Determine	the	role	that	esthetic,	cultural,	and	habitual	factors	play	in	people’s	acceptance	and	
adaptation of conventional, alternative, and future technologies. Differentiating consumer 
segments by sociodemographic characteristics of households with different behaviors and 
examining attitudinal and behavioral associations with such variables will be critical to this 
understanding. In addition, determining whether, for example, individuals tend to act more as 
individuals or as households may also be important, particularly if decision making power in 
households can be seen to reside, on average, with one or another member (such as mothers).
•	 Collect	information	(through,	for	example,	the	proposed	National	Energy	Opinion	Survey)	to	
inform energy models with respect to consumers’ expected reactions to new energy technologies 
and the perceived tradeoffs they might need to make relative to conventional (existing) 
technologies. Such technologies may be those introduced to improve the efficiency of energy 
generation, distribution, and consumption and include issues associated with the smart grid.
•	 Collect	survey	data	about	consumer	preferences	that	can	be	used	in	modeling	the	economics	of	
new types of transportation vehicles.
•	 Develop	a	methodology	for	estimating	the	externalities	associated	with	selected	alternative	
transportation fuels, such as biofuels, with the goal of comparing them with the externalities of 
petroleum-based fuels.
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Understanding the Behavioral economics of energy Consumption
As discussed in the previous chapters, the behavioral economics of energy consumption 
in a modern consumer society remains inadequately understood. In this area, numerous 
questions arise: How does America foster better energy decisions in an economy that 
seeks to increase consumption? What role do such practices as automatic bill paying and 
invisible metering have in insulating consumers from their energy choices? 
Working from the National Academies’ report and its conclusions on the inefficiencies 
in consumer behavior, the broad research issue can be framed as addressing ways in which 
the United States can improve the quality of market-driven decisions. Generating data for 
the analysis of this problem can provide decision makers with better options for reducing 
what appears to be an inherent contradiction between continued economic growth 
through the expansion of consumerism and a potential need to shift to a post-cheap-
energy era. Among the specific areas to investigate are consumer behaviors related to 
energy savings, energy efficiency, and energy consumption information. As noted above, 
the externalities that influence consumption are also important to elucidate. 
Energy savings are the result of complex interactions at the intersection of the 
technology, economics, and societal factors. Investigating and explaining public behaviors 
with respect to energy savings achieved through either energy efficiency or energy 
conservation (or both) opens up new and intriguing opportunities for social science 
research, with potential major impacts on the future of the US energy infrastructure.
A large literature focuses on energy efficiency and on the reasons that individual 
economic decisions may not result in economically efficient outcomes at the societal 
level. For example, consumers may not be fully informed of alternatives or their cost-
effectiveness, or they can be shortsighted or capital constrained. Markets may not lead 
to efficient outcomes in the presence of market failures, such as imperfect information; 
moreover, markets may not optimize outcomes in the presence of externalities, such as 
those concerning the environment. Nonetheless, the specifics of market failures as they 
apply to energy sources and uses are not yet well documented. 
In addition to market failures, private decision making may lead to “behavioral 
failures.” These may lead to deviations from cost-minimizing behavior (assuming that 
cost-minimization is the principal goal). More behaviorally oriented research is needed 
to understand the nature, magnitude, and reasons for these energy behavioral failures. 
Other questions are whether, from the point of view of consumers, they are, in fact, 
failures or instead represent informed, defensible choices that simply do not accord 
with conventional views about rational behavior. Such research must be done taking 
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socioeconomic variables into account, insofar as education and income are likely to be 
prominent predictors of behaviors that involve the expenditure (or the saving) of money. 
Residential energy consumers may be relatively unresponsive to price changes in 
their residential energy use, particularly electricity. This insensitivity to cost may arise, 
at least in part, because they lack or ignore information on the quantity of energy used 
by individual devices in their homes. Therefore, provision, or clearer articulation, of 
information about these externalities to consumers may reduce the environmental 
externalities of energy production and consumption.
analyzing the effects of Climate Change on Future energy production and 
Consumption
The relationship between global climate change and energy has traditionally been 
framed as extending essentially in one direction: the consumption of fossil fuels must be 
reduced to limit CO2 emissions and, therefore, reduce the greenhouse effect. Considerable 
technical research has gone into the physical aspects of this proposition. Less well 
understood is whether consumers conceptualize the question in the same way and, for 
that matter, whether they understand such basics as the existence of a greenhouse effect or 
the relationship between that and CO2 emissions. 
Also worth investigating are aspects of essentially the inverse of this problem: the 
effects of any future changes in climate on future energy production and consumption. 
For example, policy makers might want to know whether warmer temperatures lead to 
more energy demand through greater use of air conditioning or less demand because less 
heat is used. Improving our understanding of the effects of global temperature changes 
on our energy needs, on our ability to generate energy, and on energy use is crucial in 
researching the energy future.
We recommend that federal agencies support research that addresses the following issues:
•	 Determine	and	quantify	the	factors	responsible	for	consumer	behaviors	regarding	energy	use	and	
savings	through	choices	reflecting	efficiency	and	energy	conservation.
•	 Determine	the	nature	and	magnitude	of	behavioral	failures	in	private	decision	making	that	lead	
to deviations from cost-minimizing behavior.
•	 Assess	how	best	to	communicate	to	residential	energy	consumers	the	quantity	of	energy	being	
used by individual devices to reduce the environmental externalities of energy production and 
consumption.
•	 Evaluate	strategies	for	integrating	the	societal	factors	(e.g.,	society’s	preferences)	into	best	
practices for modeling energy demand and supply.
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Understanding energy politics
Researchers and policymakers lack a deep understanding of how energy politics works 
and how energy preferences intersect with broader questions of how voter preferences 
are formed. Political opposition, on many (and conflicting) fronts, remains an obstacle 
to solving America’s energy challenges. Such opposition (or support) can take the form, 
for instance, of resistance to greater federal investment in new technologies or as local 
opposition to particular kinds of facilities. Research in both communities, and through 
nationally representative samples, that explores the factors that influence people’s 
perceptions and choices would provide information helpful for decision makers. Such 
findings would enable them to better understand the policymaking climate in which 
energy options at the national, regional, or local level will be debated and decided. Such an 
understanding would contribute to a healthier, more transparent politics of energy.
The role of energy in determining voters’ choices is inadequately understood. A 
growing body of literature addresses “green politics,” and anecdotal information suggests 
that energy policy plays an important role in political campaigns. Nevertheless, we lack 
in-depth studies of the degree to which energy challenges influence Americans’ choices at 
the ballot box.
In light of these issues we see the following research opportunities:
•	 Assess	the	effects	of	climate	change	on	energy	consumption	and	future	energy	production	needs	
based on the predicted impact of climate change on the environment. Research that is focused on 
the responses people make to supposed or real impacts of climate change might entail collecting 
data on people’s ideas of what they might do, given different scenarios about climate change, and 
modeling these responses in various ways.
•	 Utilize	the	results	of	such	“impact	assessments”	to	direct	the	development	of	strategies	that	lead	
to an optimal portfolio of energy production and to programs that encourage consumers to make 
informed choices among energy sources. 
We recommend the following research initiatives:
•	 Determine	how	energy	preferences	intersect	with	broader	questions	of	how	voter	preferences	are	
formed and whether such preferences differ by sociodemographic or other characteristics; such 
information gives policymakers a deeper understanding of how energy politics works and how 
best to reach voters with accurate, appropriate, and persuasive information.
•	 Conduct	in-depth	studies	on	the	degree	to	which	energy	challenges	influence	Americans’	choices	
at the ballot box.
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Forecasting the Geopolitics of energy
The geopolitics of energy has long been understood to be unstable. The distribution of the 
primary energy sources is dramatically uneven across the surface of the earth and within 
its nation-states. The full impact of this instability and inequality is less well documented 
or understood.
Thus, we see a need for two related research avenues: (1) more extensive modeling 
of energy geopolitics per se and (2) integration of changes in energy production and 
consumption into these models. To prepare for America’s future energy security needs, 
researchers must better predict how shifts in the global balance of power and shifts in 
energy supply and demand will change regional and global politics. Better data for both 
the nation and the world will be needed to populate such models with accurate and 
reasonably up-to-date facts, if they are to serve policymakers in a timely manner.
A switch to electric vehicles, their market being already in its nascent stages, will 
eventually cause changes to the commercial and small-business landscape of most 
American communities. For example, conventional gas stations may become obsolete, car 
repair shops may face extensive changes in the way they do business, and newer sites of 
power (e.g., plug-in sites for those vehicles) will emerge. Local economies will be changed 
when people no longer visit retail gasoline outlets, but instead recharge their cars at home 
or in settings established for this purpose. Exactly how these types of scenarios might 
play out, over what time frame, will be very important to clarify as both governments 
and entrepreneurs begin to make decisions of considerable economic and political 
consequence.
For examining these types of issues, we recommend undertaking two main research 
efforts focused principally on modeling. Each may entail multiple types of investigations, 
including basic data collection from individuals and organizations or institutions:
•	 Develop	a	model	that	predicts	how	shifts	in	the	global	energy	supply	and	demand	will	affect	
global politics.
•	 Develop	a	corollary	model	that	predicts	shifts	in	local,	especially	urban,	economies	resulting	from	
the introduction of alternative and new energy sources and technologies.
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exploring and Understanding the relationships Between homeland Security 
and energy
A closer linkage needs to be made between energy research and the burgeoning field of 
emergency preparedness and homeland security. The United States has numerous clear 
short- and long-term vulnerabilities. These can range from the threat posed to energy 
facilities by terrorist attacks or natural disasters to the challenges posed by transitions 
from one energy source to another. The specter of a full-fledged energy crisis, in which 
the country cannot meet its energy needs, also constitutes a threat to homeland security. 
Moreover, these threats will not affect American communities uniformly. Linking research 
on energy to the growing interest in community resiliency offers one area of immediate 
focus.
promoting public Support for energy Solutions
US policymakers have attended insufficiently to the ways that they might promote 
public support for energy solutions. Part of the problem is that ways to build support 
remain inadequately understood, at least insofar as energy generation, distribution, and 
consumption are concerned. 
Examples abound of successful mobilization of public will. For example, consumer 
recycling in the United States has been successful as a voluntary movement, and in most 
states it does not rely on public incentives or penalties. Such examples provide a means for 
exploring how the “public mind” can be changed and motivated regarding energy options.
We recommend the following study:
•	 Assess	the	homeland	security	vulnerabilities	posed	by	potential	near-term	or	longer-term	
shortages of various energy sources, especially in the context of a possible inability to mitigate 
those shortages quickly.
We recommend the following initiatives:
•	 Develop	an	integrated	knowledge	database	drawn	from	all	the	results	of	the	research	initiatives	
proposed in the above sections.
•	 Formulate	communication	strategies	that	help	to	inform	the	US	public	on	best	energy	practices	
that will lead to energy sufficiency and independence into the future.
•	 Formulate	communication	strategies	that	help	to	inform	US	policymakers	on	the	public’s	
perceptions about acceptable energy sources, practices, and technologies. 
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reimagining the US Department of energy’s Identity and Scope
In our view, the technological and economic dimensions of the energy challenge are 
necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for defining and implementing America’s 
energy future. The societal dimension supplies a necessary, and also the required sufficient 
condition, for enabling future improvements in the US energy infrastructure. In this 
endeavor, the US Department of Energy’s scope of interests could fruitfully expand 
further into the social dimensions of the energy challenge, as recommended in the recent 
report of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.86 
Conclusion
What unites each of these avenues for future research is a common theme: the need to 
advance our understanding of the societal contexts in which energy decisions are made. 
Given the “three-dimensional” nature of the energy conundrum, deeper understanding 
requires the simultaneous considerations of energy technologies, energy economics, and 
societal factors. It also calls for cross-disciplinary efforts to break the traditional limiting 
boundaries between these dimensions and to identify and harness their synergies. 
Of course, we cannot lay out here a detailed research agenda that takes account of the 
many social science fields that can contribute to this goal. We also have not attempted 
to specify the many different study designs, modes of data collection, or analytic and 
statistical approaches that might be employed. Rather, we hope that our narrative will 
motivate a more holistic and multidisciplinary conversation about energy and help charter 
a research agenda that can provide practical, yet sustainable, long-term solutions to the 
energy needs of our society.
To foster this goal, we recommend the following steps:
•	 Expand	the	US	Department	of	Energy’s	formal	scope	to	include	societal	factors	when	developing	
long-range sustainable solutions for meeting America’s future needs.
•	 Incorporate	science-based	societal	information	gathered	from	research	outlined	in	the	above	
sections into the decision making process.
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America’s Energy Future:  
Technology and Transformation 
EXCERPTS OF INTEREST FOR SOCIETAL RESEARCH
appeNDIX
The following excerpts come from America’s Energy Future: Technology and 
Transformation.2
“The report’s aim is to inform policy makers about technology options for transforming 
energy production, distribution, and use to increase sustainability, support long-term 
economic prosperity, promote energy security, and reduce adverse environmental 
impacts” (p. 1).
“Mobilization of the public and private sectors, supported by sustained long-term 
policies and investments, will be required for the decades-long effort to develop, 
demonstrate, and deploy these technologies” (p. 1).
“A number of current barriers are likely to delay or even prevent the accelerated 
deployment of the energy-supply and end-use technologies described in this report. Policy 
and regulatory actions, as well as other incentives, will be required to overcome these 
barriers” (p. 6).
“[M]any uncertainties remain on the scientific, technological, and policy frontiers and 
in energy markets” (p. 6).
“[T]he committee will evaluate energy technologies with respect to:
•	 Estimated	times	to	readiness	for	deployment
•	 Current	and	projected	costs	(e.g.,	per	unit	of	energy	production	or	savings)
•	 Current	and	projected	performance	(e.g.,	efficiency,	emissions	per	unit	of	output)
•	 Key	technological,	environmental,	economic,	policy,	and	societal	factors	that	would	
enhance or impede development and deployment
•	 Key	environmental	(including	CO2 mitigation), economic, energy security, societal, 
and other life-cycle impacts arising from deployment
•	 Key	research	and	development	(R&D)	challenges”	(p.	10).
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“In many cases, energy-efficiency gains that could have further moderated per-capita 
energy demand have instead been used to support new demands for energy, for example, 
through increased size and performance of light-duty vehicles” (p. 11).
“The committee uses the term ‘energy security’ to mean protection against disruptions 
to the energy supply chain” (p. 12).
“These market costs often did not account for ‘externality’ costs such as those stemming 
from the environmental and health impacts of producing, distributing, and consuming 
energy” (p. 14).
“The use of fossil fuels to generate energy has a number of deleterious impacts on land 
resources, water supplies, and the well-being of citizens” (p. 16).
“[Regarding CO2 capture and storage,] substantial new regulations would have to be 
formulated to address safety, ownership, and liability issues” (p. 16).
“While the development and widespread deployment of both evolutionary and new 
technologies will play a central role in transforming the energy system, so too will new 
public policies and international collective actions that are equitable, efficient, and 
effective. Such collaborations will be needed not only because of the inherently global 
nature of the challenges but also because of the differing priorities and capacities of other 
countries” (p. 29).
“[T]he transformation must engage the routine attention of the public itself ” (p. 29).
“The committee did not, however, conduct an integrated assessment of how these 
technologies might compete in the marketplace and how that competition and other 
external factors could affect actual deployment rates and outcomes over time. For 
example, the successful deployment of energy efficiency technologies could reduce the 
demand for electricity and the need to deploy additional electricity-generation capacity” 
(pp. 31–32).
“The committee has not made judgments about the relative desirability of the supply 
options described in this report or about their appropriate pace and scale of deployment. 
Such decisions are beyond the committee’s charge and are the responsibility of policy 
makers, investors, consumers, and, indeed, all citizens” (p. 32).
“The report does not provide an evaluation of the full range of options for reducing 
energy use. Such reductions are generally understood to be obtainable in two ways: 
(1) deploying technologies to improve the efficiency of energy production and use and 
(2) conserving energy through behavioral or lifestyle changes” (p. 32).
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“A study on energy conservation would require, for example, an in-depth 
understanding of how societal, economic, and policy factors affect energy consumption” 
(p. 33).
“Society is giving more attention to the environment and other externalities as 
exemplified, for example, by concerns about the impacts of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions on global climate change” (p. 40).
“To achieve such benefits, however, the efficiency savings must translate into actual 
reductions in energy consumption. This has been a particular issue in the transportation 
sector, where efficiency improvements that could have been used to raise vehicle fuel 
economy were instead offset by higher vehicle power and increased size” (p. 40).
“Substantially greater energy-efficiency savings could likely be obtained with a 
more aggressive mix of policies, regulations, and incentives to encourage an even 
wider deployment of energy-efficiency technologies. However, it should be noted that 
businesses and consumers have historically been resistant to making even modest upfront 
investments in such technologies…. New approaches may be required to break these 
patterns” (p. 49).
“A key finding of the present report is that there are substantial opportunities to reduce 
energy use through the widespread deployment of energy-efficiency technologies in 
buildings, industry, and transportation. The costs of deploying many of these technologies 
are much less than the costs to purchase energy; in fact, in these cases deployment saves 
money as well as energy. In spite of such advantages, many consumers are reluctant 
to make the necessary investments to deploy these technologies. Why the apparent 
dichotomy persists is the subject of ongoing research, which has already identified several 
reasons.
“One reason for the behavioral gap between economically optimal technology 
choices and actual choices is the low salience of energy efficiency for consumers. That is, 
consumers in this case do not reflect the neoclassical economic model of the optimizing 
consumer. Although real-world consumers may recognize that purchasing an energy-
efficient technology would be economically beneficial, the net benefits are usually so small 
relative to family budgets that individuals do not take the time to gather and analyze the 
requisite information.
“Another reason for the gap has to do with the difficulty of changing consumers’ 
purchasing and use habits. Preferences learned from parents, neighbors, and friends may 
change only very slowly, if at all. Also, most consumers do not calculate lifecycle costs 
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when making purchases but instead focus primarily on first-purchase costs. Producers, 
who understand this bias, may be reluctant to design and market energy-efficient products 
unless forced to do so by governmental regulation.
“Part of the behavioral gap is also based on economic-incentive issues—e.g., landlords 
of residential rental units are not motivated to pay for more efficient technologies 
when their tenants pay the utility bills. There are also historical path dependencies. For 
example, many existing building codes were developed when energy costs were not 
seen as important; these codes were optimized for safety, not for minimum lifecycle 
costs. Consumers also pay attention to product characteristics that tend to be ignored by 
analysts. They resisted buying early- generation compact fluorescent lamps, for instance, 
because they did not like the color of the light produced.
“Continuing research is needed to more fully understand these and other reasons for 
the behavioral gap and to devise appropriate strategies for closing it” (p. 50, Box 2.2).
“[C]orn ethanol is likely to serve only as a transition fuel to more sustainable biofuels 
production, given the societal and environmental concerns about using corn for fuel” (p. 
63).
“R&D in other scientific fields that are not addressed in this report will likely provide 
important support for the development and deployment of new energy supply and 
end-use technologies. … Additionally, social science research on how households and 
businesses make decisions could lead to more effective measures to encourage energy 
efficiency” (p. 75).
“In the buildings sector, regulatory policies do not usually reward utility investments 
in energy efficiency; building owners in rental markets and builders are not responsible 
for paying energy costs and thus lack incentives to make investments that reduce energy 
use; information about the energy costs of specific appliances and equipment is often not 
readily available; and access to capital for such investments is limited. Drivers for greater 
efficiency— that is, for overcoming these barriers—could include rising energy costs, 
growing environmental awareness, improved and publicized building codes and appliance 
efficiency standards, and state and local-utility programs” (pp. 87–88).
“However, at a high level of renewable technology deployment, land use and other 
local impacts would become quite important. In the past, such impacts have provoked 
local opposition to the sitting of renewable electricity-generating facilities and associated 
transmissions lines, and opposition is likely to occur in the future” (p.101).
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“About 12 percent of US petroleum resources and 20 percent of US natural gas 
resources are believed to lie in areas that, for a variety of policy reasons, are currently off-
limits” (p. 103).
“The issue for policy makers is to balance the energy security and economic benefits 
of developing these currently off-limits resources against the potentially negative 
environmental impacts” (p. 103).
“Public opinion about nuclear power has improved in recent years, at least in part 
because of the safe and reliable performance of existing plants, but it would likely become 
more negative if safety or security problems arose. The absence of a policy decision 
regarding the disposal of long-lived nuclear wastes, while not technically an impediment 
to the expansion of nuclear power, is still a public concern. 18 new reactor constructions 
have been banned in 13 states as a result, although several of these states are reconsidering 
their bans” (pp. 113–114).
“And the prospects for the Yucca Mountain repository are substantially diminished by 
the declared intent of the Obama Administration not to pursue this disposal site” (p. 115).
“[L]egislative and regulatory changes are needed to provide utilities and customers 
with adequate incentives to invest in modernization” [of the electricity transmission and 
delivery systems] (p. 117).
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